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Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes: 
Yniguez and the Racialization of English Only 
PROLOGUE 
Maria-Kelly Yniguez spoke Spanish on the job. As an insurance claims 
manager for the State of Arizona, she managed medical malpractice claims 
asserted against the state. I A Latina fluent in English and Spanish, Maria 
often spoke Spanish to Latino claimants to help them understand intricate 
legal concepts related to their claims.2 She inquired about the nature of their 
injuries, explained state policies and drafted documents in both Spanish and 
English to ensure that limited-English speakers knew the significance of the 
papers they were signing.3 For Maria, Spanish was also "part of her cultural 
heritage."4 Her bilingualism thus provided Spanish-speakers not only vital 
information needed to process their claims but a sense of community. 
In November 1988, Arizona voters passed Article 28,S Arizona's English 
Only amendment. It proclaimed that the State "shall act in English and no 
other language."6 Upon its enactment, Maria stopped speaking Spanish to all 
clients for fear of employee sanctions,7 thereby foreclosing communication 
with a substantial portion of her department's Latino clientele. With the 
passage of Article 28, bilingual clerks, teachers and state senators, among 
others, feared they would be unable to advise people who could speak only 
Spanish or Chinese or Navajo.s Limited-English speaking residents could not 
I Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920,924 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
vacated, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). 
2 Brief For Respondent Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, 1996 WL 426410, at ·1, Yniguez v. 
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). Maria-Kelly Yniguez 
spoke English to English-speaking clients, Spanish to Spanish-speaking clients, and a 
combination of the two languages to clients who could understand both. Id. 
3 Stipulation as to Foundation and Non-Hearsay Nature of Certain Public Records and 
Reports at 3-5, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
974). Important meanings, feelings and concepts, she thought, were often most clearly and 
vividly expressed in Spanish. Id. at 5. 
4 Id. at 3 (citing Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, at para 7). For Maria, Spanish conveyed 
a "sense of community and experiences shared by Hispanics." Brief for Petitioners, 1996 WL 
272394, at ·3-4, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 
95-974) (citing Joint Appendix, at 45, 51). She also spoke Spanish on the job "to demonstrate 
[her] belief that Arizona enjoys a pluralistic society." Id. at ·4 (quoting Joint Appendix at 45). 
S ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII. 
6 Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(citing ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII §§ 1 (3)(a)(iv) and 3(1)(a». 
7 Id. 
SId. at 952 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). See also Ruiz v. Symington, No.1 CA-CV 94-
0235,1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, June 11, 1996) (related Arizona state court case). 
222 University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol.19:221 
communicate effectively with employees of a state housing office, clerks at 
the small claims court or legislators inquiring about concerns of their 
community.9 Yniguez filed suit against the State of Arizona on the grounds 
that the provision violated the First Amendment's protection of free speech 
and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection against 
invidious racial classifications. lo Among her reasons for filing suit was her 
concern for the Latinos denied governmental services in a language they could 
understand. II • 
In Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,12 the Ninth Circuit struck 
down Arizona' s English Only amendment on First Amendment grounds. 13 
Noticeably absent from the court's opinion was a discussion of whether 
Article 28 is a racial classification for strict scrutiny purposes. In Arizonans 
for Official English v. Arizona,14 the United States Supreme Court likewise 
bypassed racial classification analysis, ignoring racial issues entirely. The 
Court instead vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and directed dismissal by 
the Arizona District Court based on issues of mootness and jurisdiction. IS In 
all likelihood, the United States Supreme Court will soon determine the 
constitutionality of Article 28 on appeal from the Arizona state COurtS. 16 At 
that time, the Court may address the appropriate standard of review, including 
whether Article 28 is a racial classification. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Maria-Kelly Yniguez's challenge to Article 28 provides fertile ground for 
examining the law's approach to defining race. Courts, lawyers and 
legislatures often mistakenly view race as immutable and biologically-
The plaintiffs in Ruiz include four Arizona state elected officials, five state employees and one 
private citizen, all of whom are bilingual in Spanish and English. [d. at ·3. See infra note \ 13 
and accompanying text. 
9 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 941. 
10 [d. at 925. 
\I Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, at 5, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 
920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
12 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. I 995)(en bane). 
\3 [d. See infra Part II.A. 
14 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). 
U [d. at 1060. See infra Part I1.B. 
16 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. at 1075 (referring to Ruiz v. 
Symington, No.1 CA-CV 94-0235,1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, June 11, \996». See 
also Judy Wiessler, High Court Sidesteps English-Only Ruling/Another Arizona Case Likely 
to Resurface, HOUST. CHRON., Mar. 4, 1997, at 7. See infra notes 22-23, 112-13 and 
accompanying text. 
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detennined'7 rather than socially constructed. '8 Based on this flawed 
assumption, and often without analysis, courts detennine whether a 
governmental classification is "racial" for purposes of constitutional 
scrutiny.19 Yniguez's story and its surrounding racialized20 rhetoric raise the 
question of when a facially neutral classification is ''racial'' in order to invoke 
strict scrutiny review. Using Yniguez's story, and through analysis of its 
surrounding discourse, this Comment explores how the law misdefines race. 
This Comment also offers the beginnings of an alternative theoretical 
framework for detennining whether a particular governmental classification 
is racial for constitutional scrutiny purposes. 
Because the Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of 
Article 28 and vacated all lower court Yniguez rulings, the question of whether 
Article 28 is a racial classification remains unanswered. The Supreme Court, 
however, may detennine the legality of Article 28 in the near future. 21 The 
issue of Article 28's "proper construction" is before the Arizona Supreme 
Court in Ruiz v. Symington,ll and commentators suggest that the United States 
Supreme Court will likely review the Arizona high court's ruling.23 On 
11 See infra Part III discussing "Biological Race." 
18 The "social construction" of race, as I use the tenn, refers to the ongoing process of 
creation, shaping and transfonnation of race by social and political forces. This fonning and 
refonning ofrace thereby imbues groups, social practices and events with racial meaning. My 
definition is based upon the theory of ''racial formation" developed by critical sociologists, 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMA nON 
INTIIE UNITED STATES FROMTIIE 1960s TOTIIE I 990s (2d. ed. 1994). See infra notes 176-78 
and accompanying text. See also Ian Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. I, 11 (1994) 
(describing race as socially fabricated by humans rather than created by natural differentiation). 
See infra Part IV describing race as a social construction. 
19 According to the infamous Carolene Products footnote four, when detennining the 
existence of racial classifications, courts look to political powerlessness and existence of 
stereotypes, among other things, to detennine whether a group is "discrete and insular." U.S. 
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Footnote four, which is attentive to 
history and social conditions, is frequently cited as justification for heightened scrutiny of racial 
classifications. However, it has not, in following cases, been employed to detennine whether 
a group was a racial minority. Courts instead have assumed a biological "immutable" 
conception of race. See infra Part III. 
20 See Michael Omi, Out of the Melting Pot and Into the Fire: Race Relations Policy, in 
THE STATE OF ASIAN AMERICA: POLICY ISSUES TO THE YEAR 2020203 (1993) (describing 
notion of "racialization. "). See infra Part IV for a discussion of ''racialization.'' 
21 See infra Part I1.B. See also Wiessler, supra note 16, at 7. 
22 No. I CA-CV 94-0235,1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App. Div. I, June 11, 1996). 
23 See Howard Fischer, English-Only Law Bypassed by High Court, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, 
Mar. 4, 1997, at I A; Linda Greenhouse, 'Official' English Lawsuit Rejected But Issue Stays 
Alive in Arizona, NEW ORLEANS TIMEs-PICAYUNE, Mar. 4, 1997 at A I. See infra Part I1.B. 
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review, unless the Court finds grounds for heightened constitutional scrutiny, 24 
the facially neutral Article 28 will be subject to rational basis review.2s The 
Court applies the rigorous strict scrutiny standard to "suspect" classifications 
such as race or national origin.26 In contrast, the rational basis standard 
applies when there is no suspect or semi-suspect class.27 Using rational basis 
review, the Court customarily defers to legislative action; whereas under strict 
scrutiny the Court almost always invalidates the governmental classification.28 
It is for this reason that the standard of review is crucial: it will likely 
determine whether Arizona's English Only amendment and others like it are 
legitimized. The dissent in Yniguez and the trial court in Ruiz both found the 
First Amendment challenge unavailing.29 Thus, a likely threshold question for 
the Supreme Court will be whether Article 28 should be treated as a racial 
classification, invoking strict scrutiny review.30 The framework selected for 
addressing this question will likely decide the legality of not only English 
24 Classifications which are "suspect" or that abridge fundamental rights are subject to strict 
scrutiny review. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
2S Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
26 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (race); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) 
(national origin). Under this rigorous standard, the state action in question must serve a 
compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 
2097; City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
27 Railway Express, 336 U.S. 106. The classification will be upheld if it is merely 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. 
28 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,8 
(1971) (strict scrutiny standard is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact''). But see Adarand, 115 S. 
Ct. 2097 (attempting to dispel the notion of strict scrutiny as fatal in fact). 
29 See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 960 (9th Cir. 1995) (en 
banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Ruiz v. Symington, No. I CA-CV 94-0235,1996 WL 309512, 
at·3 (Ariz. App. Div. I, June II, 1996). See infra text accompanying notes 80-82. 
30 Although several articles have addressed the racial character of the English Only 
movement, only a few have addressed in depth the notion of language restrictions as racial 
classifications. See Antonio 1. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice 
Spoh!n Here, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 293 (1989) (refuting English Only policy arguments 
and asserting federal English Only bill's violation of equal protection); Juan F. Perea, 
Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism and Official 
English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1992) (using historical analysis to expose nativist 
underpinnings and reject constitutionality of Official English laws); Note, "Official English ": 
Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1345 
(1987) (arguing that language minorities are quasi-suspect classes for equal protection 
purposes); Andrew Averbach, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: 
When is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REv. 481 (1994) (suggesting 
a subjective intent standard for finding connections between race and language for equal 
protection purposes); Michele Arington, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle 
in the States Over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325 (1991). These articles, 
however, do not articulate a theoretical framework for making that detennination. 
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Only statutes across the country but also facially neutral legislation 
concerning welfare, immigration and other issues with racial impacts.3) 
This Comment asserts that the appropriate framework for examining racial 
classifications is not based on biological determinants. Rigid biologically-
determined racial categories have little scientific basis32 and were historically 
part of a pseudo-scientific effort to justify white superiority.33 Instead, the 
appropriate framework is based on ''racial formation"34 theory and the socio-
legal concept of the social construction of race.3S Racial formation is a 
sociohistorical process by which social and political forces continually create, 
shape and transform race, thereby imparting racial meaning to groups, social 
practices and events.36 Race is thus changeable rather than fixed, political 
rather than biological and value-laden rather than neutrap7 
Accordingly, this Comment proposes the following principle: A 
governmental classification is racial for strict scrutiny purposes if, considering 
all the circumstances, the classification is substantially racialized. As 
discussed below, this means focusing not only on legislators' elusive 
"intent,"38 but on all of the circumstances giving rise to the framing, adoption 
and implementation of the classification as well as the classification's racial 
31 Upholding the statute thus sends a message to other states contemplating enaction of 
similar restrictive English Only laws that such laws are appropriate. Commentators have also 
suggested that the revival of Arizona's English Only amendment could further stimulate the 
backlash against immigrants and non-English speaking minorities. See David Savage, English-
Only Appeal Goes to Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, at I (reporting on Yniguez 
case). 
32 See Lopez, supra note 18, at 11-16. See also infra Part III. 
33 See Neil Gotanda,A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind", 44 STAN. L. REv. I, 
28 (1991) (observing that the treatment of race as a fixed essence stems from both natural 
science, originally used to prove Negro inferiority, and physiognomy, suggesting the existence 
of unalterable biological characteristics). See infra Part III. 
34 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55-56. See infra Part IV discussing "Racial 
Formation." 
3S See infra Part IV. 
36 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55-56. 
37 See infra Part IV. 
38 The doctrine of discriminatory purpose requires a showing that legislators intended to 
single out a particular racial group for unequal treatment. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976). In addition, intent must be "because of," not "in spite of' the unequal treatment. 
Personal Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Professor Charles 
R. Lawrence, III has suggested a "cultural meaning" test as an alternative to the traditional 
"intent" test. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The [d, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,324 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, Unconscious 
Racism]. Lawrence's test uncovers unconscious racism deeply ingrained in the culture and 
triggers judicial recognition of race-based behavior when there is a finding that the culture 
attaches racial significance to a govemmental action. [d. See also infra note 228. 
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effects.39 This also means challenging as inadequate the narrow biological 
definition of race currently employed by the Court, recognizing the social and 
political construction of race, and inquiring into whether the classification is 
imbued with racial meaning and impact. Application of this framework 
reveals the weakness in English Only proponents' arguments that Article 28 
is not about race. It illuminates their efforts to cloak in ostensibly "neutral" 
culture-based assertions40 their implicit arguments for allocating resources and 
opportunity along raciallines.41 This framework, attentive to context and 
history, is developed in preliminary fashion and is meant to serve as a starting 
point with which to examine the connection between law and racial dynamics. 
Because the Supreme Court set aside Yniguez, the framework has larger 
relevance for analyzing possible future suits based on Article 28 or other cases 
involving arguably racialized governmental classifications. 
This Comment is divided into five Parts. Part II describes Yniguez and 
Arizona's English Only amendment in the context of increasing U.S. backlash 
against immigration. Part ill identifies the current legal notion of race as 
immutable and biological rather than as malleable and culturally and 
politically constructed, and describes its limitations and inaccuracies. Part IV 
introduces racial formation both as a relevant theoretical framework and a 
critique of the notion of race as biological and immutable. Finally, Part V sets 
forth an alternative legal principle for determining whether a racial 
classification exists for strict scrutiny purposes and illustrates its application. 
through an analysis of the facially neutral Arizona English Only amendment, 
the Yniguez case and surrounding debates. 
39 See infra Part V setting forth the proposed framework. 
40 See infra Part V.B.2. See also Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and 
Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an lmmigration-
Driven Multiracial SOciety, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 863, 874 (1993) (examining and rejecting both 
race-based and culture-based immigration restriction arguments). 
41 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering 
Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821 (1997) [hereinafter Yamamoto, 
Critical Race Praxis] (observing that many in power positions use cultural difference to justify 
exclusion ofracialized groups from the polity). 
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II. THE YNIGUEZ CASE IN SOCIAL CONTEXT 
The Yniguez case arises at a time of nationwide anti-immigrant backlash.42 
Rapidly increasing Asian and Latino immigrant populations,43 perceived as 
threats to white racial and cultural homogeneity," are increasingly subject to 
restrictive laws.45 Anti-immigrant supporters rally to deny welfare to illegal 
and legal immigrants,46 abolish affIrmative action47 and deny health care and 
education to illegal immigrants.48 Border security has become a national 
rallying cry.49 As Professor Bill Ong Hing argues, underlying these anti-
immigrant debates is a fear that "immigrants will leave their nonwhite mark 
on the American landscape. "50 
Within this anti-immigrant movement, a burgeoning English Only 
movement has resurfaced.51 The United States House of Representatives in 
August 1996 passed a national English Only bill. 52 Presidential candidate Bob 
. 
42 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation ": Race, Immigration, and 
Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. III (1996) (describing hostility and nativist sentiment 
of recent immigration debates); Frank Wu, Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for 
Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. &PoL'YREv. 35 (1996) (examining current immigration law 
debates); Hing, supra note 40. 
43 Between 1970 and 1990 the Latino population increased by 141 percent, and the Asian 
population grew by 384.9 percent. Hing, supra note 40, at 865 (utilizing these statistics to 
illustrate reasons for increasing anti-immigrant backlash). By the year 2000, Latinos will be 
the largest minority group in the United States. Tim Chavez, For Hispanic People, Big GOP 
Tent is Big Lie, GANNElT NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 8, 1996, available ·in WESTLAW, 
GANNETTNS File. By the middle of the 21st century only half of the United States population 
is expected to be non-Hispanic whites. Steven Holmes, Census Sees a Profound Ethnic Shift 
in Us., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at A8 (reporting on census study). Hispanics are expected 
to make up 24.5 percent of the population, an increase from today's 10.2 percent, and Asians 
will comprise 8.2 percent, up from the current 3.3 percent. Id. . 
44 See Daina Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty 
Liberalism, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1053,1078 (1994). 
4S See generally Johnson, supra note 42, at 111-13. 
46 See Clinton Will Sign Welfare Overhaul, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 1,1996, at AI. 
47 See Dave Lesher, Battle Over Prop. 209 Moves to the Courts, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, 
at A-I. 
48 See Paul Feldman, Major Portions of Prop. 187 Thrown Out By Federal Judge, L.A. 
TIMEs, Nov. 21,1995, at I. 
49 See Johnson, supra note 42, at 111-13. 
so Hing, supra note 40, at 875. 
SI Califa, supra note 30, at 295. 
S2 See House Passes Bill Maldng English Federal Government s Official Language, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, Aug. I, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS file (reporting that 
English Only bills have been introduced in every Congress since 1983). The recently-passed 
House English Only bill declared English the "official language of the Government of the 
United States" in order to preserve national unity and to ''prevent division along linguistic 
lines." H.R. 123, l04th Cong., 2d sess. (1995). Under the bill, the Federal Government must 
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Dole called for English Only to protect threats to ''national unity."53 Twenty-
two states have passed laws establishing English as their official language, 
nineteen of which were passed in the 1980s and 1990s.54 U.S. English, an 
English Only advocacy group, boasts a membership of close to one million. 55 
Like anti-immigrant proponents, English Only supporters cloak underlying 
racial debates about who belongs to the polity in "neutral" terms of 
"American" culture.56 English Only laws, enacted in part to counteract the 
perceived threat to mainstream culture, operate in practice to exclude 
undesirable nonwhite groups from the polity. 57 It is within this context that 
Arizona's electorate passed Article 28. And it is against this backdrop that the 
Ninth Circuit in Yniguez struck down Arizona's English Only amendment as 
conduct all of its official business in English. Catalina Camia, House Passes Controversial 
English Bill, DALLAS MORNING NEWS. Aug. 2, 1996, at AI. The bill purports to promote 
assimilation. efficiency and fairness. H.R. 123. l04th Cong .• 2d sess. (1995). See also Marc 
Lacey. Translating the English Only Bill. L.A. TIMEs. Aug. 9. 1996. at A3 (exploring possible 
effects of a federal English Only bill) .. 
53 Jan Crawford Greenburg. High Court will Hear 'Official English' Case. CInc. TRIB .• 
Mar. 26. 1996. at 6. 
54 Joseph Torres. Language is Poised to Become a Defining Election Issue. IDAHO 
STATESMAN. May 7. 1996. at I. Hawai'i recognizes both English and Hawaiian as official 
languages. HAW. CoNST. art. XV § 4. See also Steven Bender. Consumer Protection for 
Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace. 45 AM. u. L. 
REv. 1027 (1996) (noting the difference between "English Only" laws which prohibit the 
government from speaking languages other than English and "Official English" laws which 
make English the "official"language of the state). 
55 David Savage. English-Only Law Stands, Court Says. L.A. TIMES. Mar. 4. 1997. at A3. 
U.S. English was founded by John Tanton and S.I. Hayakawa in 1983 and is the oldest 
organization dedicated to making English the nation's official language. Stephen Green. House 
Votes to Make English the Official Federal Language. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm .• Aug. 2. 1996. 
at A I. FAIR. the Federation for American Immigration Reform, an anti-immigrant lobbying 
group was also founded by Tanton. Patrick McDonnell. Activists See Dire Immigration Threat. 
L.A. TIMEs. Aug. II. 1996. at A3. 
56 See infra Part V.B. Commentators have recognized that English Only arguments are 
often directly connected to those made by anti-immigrant groups. See, e.g .• Brief of Puerto 
Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund; National Asian Pacific American Legal 
Consortium; Legal Aid Society of San Francisco. et al .• Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official 
English. 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) (noting connection between anti-immigrant 
and English Only groups). 
57 See Perea, supra note 30. at 281. See also Marl J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent 
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction. 100 YALE L.J. 1329. 
1360-67,1397-98 (1991) (asserting that accent discrimination is a mechanism for distribution 
of power. and observing bias against "low-status" accents that depart from the norm 
"American" accent). 
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a "prohibited means of promoting the English language"58 and facially 
overbroad. 59 
Article 28 passed by ballot initiative by a one percent margin in 1988,60 the 
result of a petition drive by Arizonans for Official English to amend Arizona's 
constitution.61 The Article mandates that "[t]he English language is the 
official language of the State of Arizona't62 and that the State and "all political 
subdivisions ... [including] all government officials and employees during 
the performance of government business ... shall act in English and no other 
language."63 The Article's sweeping prohibition of non-English languages 
compels the use of English for all governmental agencies, organizations, 
municipalities, ordinances, rules, and programs including "every entity, 
person, action or item.'t64 Under the amendment, English is ''the language of 
the ballot, the public schools and all government functions and actions.'t65 Its 
enforcement provision allows any person residing in or doing business in the 
state to bring suit to enforce the Article.66 Immediately after Article 28's 
enactment, many limited-English speakers could not communicate effectively 
with the Arizona government in a language other than English, thereby giving 
rise to Yniguez's suit.67 
A. The Ninth Circuit Opinion 
In Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, Maria-Kelly Yniguez sought 
an injunction against state enforcement of Article 28 and a declaration that it 
S8 Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 947 (9thCir. 1995) (en banc), 
vacated, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). 
S9 Id. at 949. 
60 Id. at 924. Article 28 passed by a slim margin of50.5%, 569,993 to 580,830. Id. See 
also Recent Development, Ninth Circuit Invalidates Arizona Constitution s Official English 
Requirement; 109 HARV. L. REv. 1827 (1996) (reporting on and analyzing the Yniguez case). 
61 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924. Arizonans for Official English is a citizens' group which was 
the primary proponent of Article 28. Id. The Article 28 petition drive was funded by U.S. 
English. James Crawford, U.S. English - Agendas Hidden Between the Lines, HOUST. CHRON., 
Oct. 30, 1988, at 4. 
62 ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII § 1(1). 
63 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924 (citing ARIZ. CoNST. art. XXVIII §§ I (3)(a)(iv) and 3(1)(a». 
64 ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII § I (3)(b). 
6S Id. at § 1(2). 
66 Id. at § 4. After passage of the Article, Arizona Attorney General Robert Corbin stated 
"If I were to try to speak my limited Spanish on duty and someone filed suit, I would imagine 
the court would issue a restraining order. It Stipulation as to Foundation and Non-Hearsay 
Nature of Certain Public Records and Reports at 9-10, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official 
English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
67 See Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, at 5, Yniquez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
974). 
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violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.68 The district court held that 
Arizona's amendment was facially overbroad and infringed upon First 
Amendment protected speech.69 After Arizona's governor refused to appeal, 
Arizonans for Official English intervened.70 The group argued that Article 28 
encouraged unity, political stability, a common language and public 
confidence.71 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district 
court's holding that Arizona's amendment was facially overbroad and violated 
the First Amendment. 72 The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted a rehearing 
en banc.73 Writing for the majority, Judge Reinhardt rejected Arizonans for 
Official English's arguments,74 declaring that there is a "critical difference 
between encouraging the use of English and repressing the use of other 
languages."7s The en banc majority ultimately struck down Article 28 as an 
invalid regulation of public employee speech and unconstitutionally 
overbroad.76 Article 28, the court held, violated the First Amendment rights 
of Yniguez, public employees and their listeners, and government employees 
in the executive, legislative and judicial branches." The court also noted that 
"the adverse impact of Article 28' s over-breadth is especially egregious 
because it is not uniformly spread over the population, but falls almost 
entirely upon Hispanics and other national origin minorities."78 As such, the 
court reasoned, it is an unconstitutional compulsion of the use of the English 
language.79 
Judge Kozinski, in dissent, argued vigorously against First Amendment 
protection of Yniguez's speech.80 He declared that state employees cannot 
"arrest the gears of government by refusing to say or do what the state chooses 
to have said or done."81 Yniguez's speech, he contended, was in effect the 
government's speech and could therefore be constitutionally regulated by the 
state.82 
68 Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
69 Yniguezv. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309,317 (D. Ariz. 1990). 
70 Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991). 
71 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 944. 
72 [d. at 924. 
71 Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. May 12, 1995). 
74 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 944-46. 
75 [d. at 923, 946-47 (English "cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the 
Constitution. "). 
76 [d. at 947. 
77 [d. 
78 [d. 
79 [d. at 948. 
80 See id. at 960-63 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
81 [d. at 960 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
82 [d. at 962 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Reinhardt responded to Kozinski's dlssent in a rare and impassioned 
special concurrence to his own majority opinion.83 Reinhardt explicitly 
denounced the racialized, nativist fears expressed by Kozinski.84 He 
condemned Judge Kozinski's "absolutist, authoritarian" world in which 
government clerks would be unable to help Chinese, Spanish or Navajo 
persons apply for food stamps, driver's licenses, aid for their children or 
disability benefits.85 In Kozinski's world, Judge Reinhardt continued, 
"[g]overnment employees could be compelled to parrot racist and sexist 
slogans [and] to hurl hateful invective at non-English speaking people asking 
for assistance."86 His would be "an Orwellian world in which Big Brother 
could compel its minions to say War is Peace and Peace is War .... "87 
According to Judge Reinhardt, Article 28 was a nativist measure that deprived 
Spanish, Chinese and Navajo from all government assistance and severely 
penalized non-English speakers.88 
Noticeably absent from the Ninth Circuit en banc majority opinion was 
discussion of whether Article 28 is a racial classification for strict scrutiny 
purposes. Judge Reinhardt's majority opinion pointed to underlying racial 
motivations and potential effects on particular racial groups, but confined 
discussion to First Amendment issues.89 On the one hand, the majority may 
have deemed it unnecessary to engage in racial classification analysis in light 
of its First Amendment conclusion.90 On the other hand, the majority's 
absence of racial discussion might be attributable to unstated legal constraints: 
the court's unacknowledged reliance on an earlier Ninth Circuit case,91 and the 
court's embrace of the jurisprudential formulation of race as an immutable, 
biological trait. 
The Yniguez court may have relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Olagues v. Russonielo92 and decided implicitly that Article 28 was not a racial 
classification. In Olagues, the Ninth Circuit established an objective test for 
determining whether language classifications discriminate on the basis of race 
or national origin.93 An en banc majority held that a U.S. Attorney's secret 
investigation into possible voter fraud targeting Spanish-speaking and 
83 Id. at 952 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
84 Id. at 952-54 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
8S Id. at 952-53 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
86 Id. at 954 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
87 Id. at 953 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 948-49. 
90 See id. at 924. 
91 See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. 
92 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987). 
93 !d. at 1521. See also Averbach, supra note 30, at 484 (suggesting a subjective intent 
standard for establishing a nexus between race and language for equal protection purposes). 
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Chinese-speaking immigrants involved a suspect classification based on race 
and national origin.94 The court distinguished "general" classifications that 
apply to both English and non-English speakers from "specific" classifications 
that apply to specific language groupS.9S Under the test, a classification 
specifically targeting certain language groups would be subject to strict 
scrutiny. On the other hand, a broad, "general" classification merely imposing 
a disproportionate impact on a particular racial group would be deemed 
racially harmless because it applies to all groups, and as such would not 
invoke strict scrutiny.96 As the dissent in Olagues pointed out, however, there 
is no logical distinction between a general and specific classification; a 
general classification may have as racially significant an impact as a specific 
one.97 More importantly, the O/agues majority's "objective" test assumes a 
fixed, biological understanding of what race is and thus assumes easy 
determination of whether a classification specifically targets a racial groUp.98 
As mentioned earlier, the Ninth Circuit in Yniguez bypassed racial 
classification analysis entirely. It may have done so because it found 
sufficient grounds in the First Amendment. It may also have relied on 
Olagues and its shaky "objective" test - Article 28 targets the Arizona 
population in general rather than specific language groups. Or, the Ninth 
Circuit may have recognized, as the dissent in Olagues and commentators did, 
that the foundation of the objective test is outdated; it is grounded in an idea 
increasingly subject to challenge - the traditional notion of race as 
immutable and biological rather than socially constructed. 
B. The Supreme Court Opinion 
The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona on December 4, 1996.99 The Court limited its hour-
long questioning to issues of standing, mootness and jurisdiction. 100 
Specifically, the Justices focused their interrogation on whether the case had 
become moot when Yniguez left her government job, 101 whether Arizonans for 
Official English had standing as a private organization to defend the English 
94 Olagues, 797 F.2d at 1521. 
9S [d. 
96 [d. 
97 [d. at 1527 (Wallace, 1., dissenting). 
9S [d. 
99 See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona (U.S. Dec. 4, 1996) (No. 95-974). 
100 See id. 
101 [d. at 30-33. 
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Only provision 102 and whether there was a case or controversy in the ftrst 
place. 103 Chief Justice Rehnquist made it clear early on that the Justices' 
questions would be limited to standing issues rather than the constitutional 
merits of Arizona's English Only Amendment. 104 
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, lOS the United States Supreme 
Court "expresse[ d] no view on the correct interpretation of Article xxvm or 
on the measure's constitutionality."I06Instead, it decided the case on 
procedural grounds. 107 Holding that the case was moot and should not have 
been decided on the merits,l08 the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment 
and remanded the case with directions that it be dismissed by the Arizona 
District COurt. 109 In the opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court 
announced that the case had become moot when Yniguez resigned from her 
job with the state. IIO In addition, the Court indicated that the Ninth Circuit 
should have obtained a controlling construction of Article 28 from the 
Arizona Supreme Court before hearing the case. I I I Referring to a related case 
currently before the Arizona Supreme Court, 112 the Court stated that "[0 ]nce 
[the Arizona Supreme Court] has spoken, adjudication of any remaining 
federal constitutional question may indeed become greatly simplifted. "113 
102 Id. at 8-12. 
103 Id. at 50-51. See also David Savage, High Court s 'English Only' Case Boils Down to 
Legalese, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1996, at A30 [hereinafter Savage, Boils Down to Legalese] 
(reporting on the oral argument and possible implications). 
104 Steve Lash, First Amendment English Only Case Becomes High Court Debate on 
Standing, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 5, 1996, available in WESTLA W, WLN file. 
lOS 117 S. Ct. 1055(1997). 
106 Id. at 1060. 
107 See id. at 1072. 
lOS [d. 
109 [d. at 1075. 
110 [d. at 1072. 
III [d. at 1075. 
112 Ruiz v. Symington, No. I CA-CV 94-0235, 1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App. Div. I, June 
11,1996). 
113 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. at 1075. In Ruiz v. Symington, 
Arizona legislators and employees challenged the constitutionality of Article 28 on First, 
Fourteenth and Ninth Amendment grounds in Arizona State Superior Court. See Ruiz, 1996 
WL 309512, at ·3. The trial court held that Article 28 is content-neutral and as such does not 
violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. [d. In addition, according to 
the trial court, Article 28 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or the Ninth Amendment. Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. [d. at ·4. 
The appellate court adopted the analysis of the Ninth Circuit in Yniguez, and declared Article 
28 unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. See id. The Arizona Supreme Court is 
currently reviewing Ruiz to determine the ''proper'' interpretation of Article 28's language. See 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. at 1075. 
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Markedly absent from the Court's opinion and from oral argument was 
discussion of whether Article 28 is a racial classification for strict scrutiny 
purposes. Because the Supreme Court "expresse[d] no view ... on the 
measure's constitutionality," the issue remains W1resolved whether Article 28 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection against 
invidious racial classifications. I 14 It also leaves undecided whether English 
Only provisions of other states are racial classifications. As mentioned, the 
United States Supreme Court may soon review the future Arizona Supreme 
Court ruling. lIS Moreover, Article 28 or English Only provisions of other 
states may be subject to further constitutional challenges. It is for these 
reasons that a workable legal principle for determining whether a 
classification is "racial" is needed. 
lIT. THE DOMINANT PARADIGM: BIOLOGICAL RACE 
In determining whether a governmental classification is racial, courts look 
to so-called "immutable characteristics" such as race or gender. I 16 This 
dominant paradigm narrowly conceives of race as a fixed biological 
category. I 17 Rooted in Eighteenth Century pseudo-science, I 18 race is defined 
genetically and is reflected physically in skin color,1I9 facial featuresl20 and 
114 See Savage, Boils Down to Legalese, supra note 103, at A30. See supra notes 21-23 and 
accompanying text. 
liS See Wiessler, supra note 16, at 7. 
116 See infra notes 126-31. This notion of race as an immutable trait underlies the Supreme 
Court's current "colorblind" jurisprudence. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Pena, 115 
S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630 (1993); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996). 
117 Gotanda, supra note 33, at 28 (observing that the treatment of race as a fixed essence 
sterns from both natural science, originally used to prove Negro inferiority, and physiognomy, 
suggesting the existence of unalterable biologicaJ characteristics); Lopez, supra note 18, at 11. 
See also OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 54; DAVID THEo GoLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING 11 (1993). 
III See Lopez, supra note 18, at 14. 
119 Courts determined who was "white," and therefore entitled to citizenship. See, e.g., 
Gong Lum v. Rice,275 U.S. 78 (1927) (Chinese); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) 
(Japanese); United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (Asian Indians); In re 
Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909) (Armenians). 
120 See, e.g., Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (Sup. Ct. App. 1806) (using 
racial test of skin color, "flat nose and wooly head of hair" to determine whether a person is 
black or Indian). See also Lopez, supra note 18, at 2 (utilizing the case to illustrate fallacies of 
the common legal notion of race). 
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hair texture,121 and is unconnected to culture, history or social context.122 
Historically, racial categories based on ''biology'' were assumed to reflect the 
innate inferiority of nonwhites and used as justification for differential 
treatment of various racialized groups. 123 Eighteenth and Nineteenth century 
categorization of races into "Mongoloid," ''Negroid'' and "Caucasoid" was in 
fact part of an effort to justify white domination. 124 
The United States Supreme Court has historically embraced, and in recent 
cases continues to embrace, the notion of race as a fixed, biological essence. 12S 
For example, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,126 Justice 
Brennan pronounced that "race, like gender and illegitimacy is an immutable 
characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside."127 
The majority in Frontiero v. Richardsonl28 maintained that "sex, like race and 
national origin is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the 
accident of birth .... "129 Finally, Justice Stewart, dissenting in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 130 declared that "[t]he color of a person's skin and the country of his 
origin are immutable facts that bear no relation to ability, disadvantage, [or] 
moral culpability .... "131 This seemingly "objective" connection of race to 
biology, skin color and "accident of birth" and disconnection to history and 
contemporary social context gives the appearance that race is immutable. J32 
Professor Neil Gotanda terms this disconnected notion of race, "formal 
race,"133 and suggests that the Supreme Court embraces formal race when 
121 See Hudgins, II Va. (I Hen. & M.) 134. See also Lopez, supra note 18, at 14. In 
addition, many Nineteenth Century "scientists" attempted to detennine race using cranial 
capacity, brain mass, jaw size and body lice. [d. 
122 Gotanda, supra note 33, at 38. 
123 [d. at 28. Slavery, for example, was justified by the assumption that Blacks were 
inherently inferior. [d. According to the rule ofhypodescent, anyone with one drop of "negro" 
blood was racially inferior and legitimately subject to discriminatory laws. Id. at 27. 
124 Lopez, supra note 18, at 13-14. See also Cheryl Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 
HARV. L. REv. 1709, 1739 (1993); Gotanda, supra note 33, at 28-29 (arguing that these 
categories are "embedded in popular notions ofrace. "). 
I2S See Gotanda, supra note 33, at 29-32. 
126 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
127 Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., concurring/dissenting). 
128 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
129 [d. at 686. 
IJO 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
131 [d. at 524 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Gotanda, supra note 33, at 31-32 (describing 
examples of the Court's reliance on immutable, biological race). 
132 Gotanda, supra note 33, at 30-31. 
133 [d. at 4. Gotanda defines four types ofrace to analyze how legal ideology, particularly 
colorblind constitutionalism, sanctions racial inequality: "Formal race," "status race," 
"historical race," and "culture race." Id. at 4-5. 
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analyzing racial classifications.134 Fonnal race reflects only skin color or 
country of national origin and is unconnected to social context, history, 
culture, ability, disadvantage, wealth or language. 13S The category "Black," 
for example, is seen as detached from subordinate social status and historical 
experience \36 of slavery, Jim Crow laws and government-supported 
discrimination. 137 
Many race scholars assert that the dominant paradigm of unalterable, 
biological race is inaccurate and limited in several respects. 138 First, it is 
based on false biological assumptions that have no scientific basis.139 Second, 
and related, it views race as neutral and without social content,l40 failing to 
take into account the ways that race and racial categories are socially 
constructed. 141 In doing so, the paradigm does not recognize the dominant 
society's ability to racialize groups - to treat people as members of a racial 
group regardless of personal choice - and thereby perpetuate racial 
inequalities.142 By viewing race formally - neutrally and without content -
the dominant paradigm allows society to blame racial groups for their own 
oppression by pointing to their inferior culture while ignoring institutional 
forces. 143 Third, due to the way race is conceptualized in legal discourse, 
lawyers, law scholars and students working within this paradigm are 
compelled to respond with a similar narrow doctrinal frame of analysis that 
ignores the socio-historical construction of race. Finally, and specific to this 
134 Id. at 40. Gotanda suggests that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence uses fonnal race 
in its "color-blind" application of strict scrutiny to any and all racial classifications without 
regard to historical or social context. Id. According to the fonnal race approach, consideration 
is not given to past segregation or America's history of oppression. Id. at 42. Formal-race, 
according to Gotanda, perpetuates advantages for whites. Id. at 50. 
135 Id. at 4. 
136 Id. at 38. 
137 See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 6-44 (1992) (chronicle and 
commentary on America's legal treatment ofrace). 
138 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEy WRITINGS TIlAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, Kendall Thomas, eds., 1995); 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado, ed., 1995). 
139 See infra text accompanying notes 146-47. 
140 Gotanda, supra note 33, at 32. See also Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41, 
at 847. 
141 See infra Part IV discussing the social construction of race. 
142 Lopez, supra note 18, at 28. 
143 See OMi & WINANT, supra note 18, at 20. See also Charles R. Lawrence, III, Forward: 
Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1995) 
[hereinafter Lawrence, Jurisprudence of Transformation] (citing John Powell, Who Thought 
of Dropping Racial Categories. and Why?, POVERTY & RACE, Jan./Feb. 1995, at 12-13) 
(asserting that the use of purported genetic differences among races is used to justify 
subordination and exclusion). 
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discussion, the use of the traditional race-as-imrnutable framework makes it 
difficult to fmd a racial element in debates that are racially coded in 
purportedly "neutral" economic and cultural terms. l44 
Contrary to long-standing views, race can no longer be viewed as a 
concrete, biological characteristic.I~5 Studies show that racial categories do 
not reflect fundamental genetic differences, and many scientists wholly reject 
race as biologically-determined. l46 In fact, studies reveal that there are greater 
genetic differences within a "racial" group than between two "racial" 
groups. 147 
In addition to inaccuracy, a primary problem with treating race as 
biological is that it falsely assumes the neutrality and objectivity of racial 
classifications. 148 As a result of the law's reliance on physiognomy and 
ancestry to define race as evidenced by skin color, facial features, hair texture, 
and blood, 149 racial classification has "lost its connection to social reality."lso 
Professor Gotanda argues that linking racial categories to science erroneously 
14-4 See infra text accompanying notes 253-56. See also Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, 
supra note 38, at 322; Johnson, supra note 42, at 113 (observing the difficulty in uncovering 
racist goals achieved through facially neutral means). See also Matsuda, supra note 57, at 1394 
(recognizing the false neutrality of accent discrimination). Professor Angela Harris also 
observes that race is "deeply embedded" in language, perceptions and culture, and is "inscribed 
in the most innocent and neutral-seeming concepts." Angela P. Harris, Forward: The 
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 741, 743 (1994) [hereinafter, Harris, 
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction]. She explains that critical race theorists question law's 
objectivity and neutrality by "arguing that what looks like race-neutrality on the surface has a 
deeper structure that reflects white privilege." [d. at 754. 
145 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55; See also Lopez, supra note 18, at 6 ("Biological 
races like Negroid and Caucasoid simply do not exist."); Gotanda, supra note 33, at 6; 
GOLDBERG, supra note 117, at 69. 
146 See, e.g., Alice Littlefield, Leonard Liebemam & Larry T. Reynolds, Redefining Race: 
The Potential Demise of a Concept in PhYSical Anthropology, 23 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
641 (1982) (citing study that 70% of cultural anthropologists and 50% of physical 
anthropologists reject race as biologically-detennined). 
147 See Lopez, supra note 18, at 11-14 (citing Richard Lewontin, The Apportionment of 
Human DiverSity, 6 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 381, 397 (1972); Masayoshi Nei & Arun 
Roychoudhury, Genetic Relationship and Evolution of Human Races, 14 EVOLUTIONARY 
BIOLOGY 1,38 (1982». 
148 See Gotanda, supra note 33, at 32. 
149 People with one drop of African blood were racially inferior and therefore legitimately 
subject to Jim Crow laws. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Hawaiians' 
eligibility to receive Homelands parcels were also detennined by blood quantum. (fifty percent 
or more were ''native Hawaiians" and less than fifty percent were "Hawaiians. "). Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act, 1920, ch. 42 Stat. 108, reprinted in 1 HAW. REv. STAT. 167-205. 
(Supp. 1989). 
150 Gotanda, supra note 33, at 40 (objective "links between racial categorization and skin 
color, physiognomy, and ancestry reinforce the belief that race is immutable."). [d. at 30-31. 
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suggests that race is a neutral, apolitical tenn, divorced from social content. ISI 
This unconnectedness limits the concept of racism to simple personal 
prejudice, discounts historical and continuing systemic racial subordination IS2 
and presupposes a level present-day racial playing field. ls3 
The Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence reveals this dissociation. In 
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,ls4 the Court upheld a federal race-based 
preference program for minority media ownership. Justice Scalia, during oral 
argument attacked Congress' preference policy as a matter of "blood, not 
background and environment."lSs Scalia's reference to blood suggests that 
race is linked to biology and divorced from "background and environment." 
For Justice Scalia, blood, and therefore race, is neutral and devoid of social 
meaning. IS6 
In Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji,IS7 the Supreme Court held that an 
Arab American college professor could be protected from discrimination 
under 42 U.S.C. §1981.1S8 Justice White's majority opinion seemingly 
acknowledged the notion of socially-constructed race when it stated that 
"racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather than 
biological, in nature."IS9 The Court, however, ultimately based its decision on 
biological race - the "fact" that an individual is "genetically part of an 
ethnically and physiognomically distinctive subgrouping of homo sapiens."160 
The Court's reference to physiognomy indicates its reluctance to abandon the 
notion of immutable, biological race. 
Finally, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,161 the Court upheld a federal statute 
requiring minority business set-asides. In dissent, Justice Stewart invoked the 
"fact" of biological race when he declared that "[u]nder our Constitution, the 
government may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of that 
person's race. The color of a person's skin and the country of his origin are 
immutable facts that bear no relation to ability, disadvantage, [or] moral 
151 [d. at 32. 
152 [d. at 43. 
153 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1344-45 (1988) (rejecting 
neoconservative colorblindness arguments for their failure to recognize continuing societal 
racial oppression). 
154 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
ISS Gotanda, supra note 33, at 32 (quoting Scalia). 
156 See id. 
157 481 U.S. 604 (1987). 
158 [d. at 613. 
159 [d. at 610 n.5 (noting that traits that have been used to characterize races have been found 
to have little biological signifiCance). 
160 [d. at 613. See also Gotanda, supra note 33, at 31-32. 
161 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
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culpability, , ,,"162 Stewart's reference to an "objective" fact such as skin 
color is "transferred to the racial category to assert [its] immutability"163 
resulting in a racial category that looks like a fact. 164 As these examples 
suggest, and as Gotanda asserts, "objective" links between racial 
categorization and skin color, physiognomy, and ancestry are social and legal 
assertions, not scientific facts, 165 
The Yniguez English Only debate illustrates how lawyers operating within 
this dominant paradigm are sharply restricted in their legal analysis of racial 
classifications. l66 Arguments made by amicus groups in Yniguez narrowly 
defined race by assuming its immutability 'while failing to recognize the 
dynamic, changeable characteristics of race as a social construction.167 Within 
this restricted legal paradigm, many briefs struggled in their attempts to 
identify the racial character of Arizona's English Only statute and the English 
Only movement. l68 Relying on the same cases, attorneys assumed that race 
is fixed and biological and yet, with unacknowledged dissonance, argued the 
apparent cultural connection between language, race and national origin for 
equal protection purposes.169 For example, some amicus groups relied on 
162 ld. at 524 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 
163 Gotanda, supra note 33, at 31, 
164 ld. 
165 ld. at 32. Thus when Justice Powell in Fullilove declared, "the time cannot come too soon 
when no governmentaJ decision will be based upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation 
or origin," he likewise connected skin color to race and falsely invoked the notion of race as 
biological fact. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 516. 
166 My experience with the Yniguez case comes from my participation in the writing of the 
amicus brief of the Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission, Na Loio No Na Kanaka, Native Hawaiian 
Legal Corporation and Native Hawaiian Advisory Council in Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official 
English in the summer of 1996. 
167 My comments here are not meant to disparage the significant arguments made by amicus 
groups and are meant only as a critique of the limited legal paradigm itself. 
168 See, e.g., Brief of Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, et aI., Yniguez v. 
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974); Brief of the State of 
New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez and 
Arizonans Against Constitutional Tampering, Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
974); Brief of the Navajo Nation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents Yniguez and 
Arizonans Against Constitutional Tampering, Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
974). 
169 The Supreme Court has previously recognized the connection between language use and 
national origin for equal protection purposes. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(declaring that a Nebraska law outlawing the teaching of non-English languages affects only 
citizens offoreign ancestry); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926) (holding that a law 
requiring business books to be kept in English or Spanish discriminated against Chinese); Lau 
v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (concluding that the San Francisco school system's failure to 
provide English language instruction to children of Chinese ancestry is racial or national origin 
discrimination); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 
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cases embracing the biological notion of race to assert that Latinos and other 
racial minorities are "discrete and insular minorities" affected by Article 28 
and are therefore a suspect class for equal protection purposes. 170 They argued 
that Article 28, although facially neutral, invidiously discriminates against 
Latinos and other groups on the basis of immutable traits. 171 Others argued 
that language-based distinctions are a proxy for national origin 
classifications. 172 None challenged the assumption, embedded in Supreme 
Court cases, that race is solely biological. 
As revealed by these arguments, the biological-race paradigm often leaves 
hidden the racial element of English Only by overlooking the social 
construction of race. By expanding inquiry into a realm largely ignored by the 
courts, the following discussion endeavors to illustrate how race is instead an 
historically contingent social construction, inextricably connected to culture 
and history. 
IV. SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: RACIALIZATION AND THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
Rather than an unalterable, biological characteristic, race is a social 
construction173 which plays an essential part in structuring and representing 
475 (1954). See also Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) (declaring 
that workplace English Only rules may disproportionately affect Hispanics); NAACP v. City 
of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1984); Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 
F .2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that national origin discrimination includes 
discrimination "because an individual has the ... linguistic characteristics of a national origin 
group."); Asian American Business Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (C.D. 
Cal. 1989); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as 
moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). 
170 See, e.g., Brief of Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, et aI., Yniguez v. 
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). See also Note, A 
Trait-BasedApproach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164 (1985). 
171 See Brief of Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, et aI., Ynigu~, 69 F.3d 
920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
172 See Brief of the Navajo Nation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents Yniguez and 
Arizonans Against Constitutional Tampering, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 
F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
173 Lopez, supra note 18, at 7 (describing race as ''plastic and inconstant," fabricated by 
humans rather than created by natural differentiation). Whereas Lopez focuses more on 
constructed racial identity, this Comment addresses how both racial identity and current issues, 
events or debates, such as the English Only debate can also be implicitly racialized. See also 
MARy WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA (1990). By recognizing 
that race is a social construction is not to say that it does not exist. On the contrary, according 
to Omi and Winant, race should be thought of as an "element of social structure rather than an 
irregularity within it ... [and] a dimension of human representation rather than an illusion." 
OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55. See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
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the social world. 174 According to critical sociologists Michael Omi and 
Howard Winant, race is understood as an "unstable and 'decentered' complex 
of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle.',m 
This notion of race provides the basis for Omi and Winant's theory of "racial 
formation."116 Racial formation is a sociohistorical process by which race is 
created, shaped and transformed by social and political forces which in tum 
creates racial and cultural meaning. 111 As races are continually formed and 
Intersectionality. Identity Politics. and Violence Against Women o/Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 
1241 (1991 ) (observing that socially constructed categories have political significance and are 
tied to the distribution of power); Lawrence, Jurisprudence o/Transformation, supra note 143, 
at 847 n. 71 (asserting that the recognition of race as a social construction does not make it any 
less real); Harris, Jurisprudence 0/ Reconstruction, supra note 144, at 772 (suggesting that race 
as a social construction does not make it ''unreal [or] eradicable ... "). 
174 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55. 
175 Id. See also John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory. Archie Shepp. and Fire Music: 
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Lifo in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2160 
(1992) [hereinafter Calmore, Multicultural World] (defining race in similar fashion). 
176 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55. The authors posit that racial formation 
"emphasizes the social nature of race, the absence of any essential racial characteristics, the 
historical flexibility of racial meanings and categories, the conflictual character of race at both 
the 'micro-' and 'macro-social' levels, and the irreducible political aspect of racial dynamics." 
Id. at 4. This pathbreaking theory has been increasingly recognized in legal spheres to explain 
various dimensions of race in American society. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: 
Agency, Responsibility and Inte"acial Justice, 3 UCLA As. PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1996) 
[hereinafter Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances] (addressing conflict among nonwhite racial 
groups and developing the notion of differential racialization and constrained racial group 
agency as part of a framework for interracial justice); John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and 
the Culture o/Segregation: "Hewing A Stone o/Hopefrom a Mountain o/Despair", 143 U. 
P A. L. REv. 1233 (1995) [hereinafter CaImore, Racialized Space] (recognizing the racialization 
of housing segregation and offering a conception of social justice); Margaret Chon, On the Need 
for Asian American Na"atives in Law: Ethnic Specimens, Native Informants. Storytelling and 
Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4 (1995) (exploring Asian American racial formation in the 
United States); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Beyond Black and White: Racializing Asian 
Americans in a Society Obsessed with O.J., 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 165 (1995); Jennifer 
Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit 0/ Individualism in the Making 0/ Social 
Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1995); Luis Angel Toro, "A People Distinct From Others": 
Race and Identity in Federal Indian Law and the Hispanic Classification in OMB Directive No. 
15,26 TEx. TECHL. REv. 1219 (1995); John Powell, An Agenda/or the Post-Civil Rights Era, 
29 U.S.F. L. REv. 889 (1995); Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology o/Race, 46 
STAN. L. REv. 747 (1994). See also GoLDBERG, supra note 117, at 80. 
177 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55-56. The authors define racial formation as ''the 
sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and 
destroyed." Id. at 55. They describe racial formation as "a process of historicalIy situated 
projects in which human bodies and social structures are represented and organized." Id. at 55-
56. Additionally, racial formation is connected to the "evolution of hegemony, the way in 
which society is organized and ruled." Id. at 56. Based on racial formation theory, Professor 
Ian Haney-Lopez offers a theory of ''racial fabrication" to emphasize the human element of 
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reformed they are imbued with social meaning - the process of racialization. 
Racialization thus "signifies the extension of racial meaning to a previously 
racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or groUp."17S 
An example of both racial formation and racialization involves the creation 
of "Asian American" as a racial category.179 The category formed as a 
political label for the first time in the 1960s. ISO Until then, each ethnic group 
such as Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans and Korean Americans were 
recognized separately - each with small numbers and little political clOUt. ISI 
In the 1960s these groups coalesced politically into a singular "Asian 
American" racial category that became recognized legally by the federal 
census, courts and legislatures. lsz For the first time these groups shared a 
common legally-recognized racial identity and, in some respects, despite 
continuing internal dissonance, gained political clout as Asian Americans. IS3 
racialization. Lopez, supra note 18, at 28. Professor Charles Lawrence, III's theory of 
unconscious racial motivation suggests that racialization can occur on an unconscious level. 
See Lawrence, Unconscious RaCism, supra note 38. His "cultural meaning" test "posits the 
connection between unconscious racism and the existence of cultural symbols that have racial 
meaning." [d. at 324. See infra note 228. See also Linda Krieger, The Content of our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 
47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995). 
178 Omi, supra note 20, at 203. See also Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 176, at 1235 
(describing racialization as a "dialectical process of signification''). Professor Eric Yarnarnoto 
extends racialization theory to include "differential racialization." Yarnarnoto, Rethinking 
Alliances, supra note 176, at 61-64. Differential racialization "acknowledges thai historical and 
contemporary influences racialize different racial groups differently." [d. at 61. Class 
divisions, length of residence in the United States, urban/rural differences, and gender, for 
example, contribute to the differential racialization of racial groups. [d. at 61-63. Differential 
racialization between and within racial groups creates differing racial meanings for members 
of those racial groups, and those meanings in tum impact "individual identity, collective 
consciousness and political organization." Omi, supra note 20, at 207. Differential 
racialization thus contributes to differing status and power among racial groups. Yamamoto, 
Rethinking Alliances, supra at 36. 
179 aMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 89. See also YEN ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PAN-
ETHNICITY (1992). 
180 aMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 89. 
181 WILLIAM WEI, THE ASIAN AMERICAN MOVEMENT 26 (1993). 
182 [d. 
183 See aMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 89. Native Hawaiians were racialized when the 
distinction between "Hawaiian" and ''Native Hawaiian" was constructed. Pressured by sugar 
plantations to limit the amount of benefits Hawaiians would receive, Congress defined ''Native 
Hawaiian" as "those people with 50 percent or more native blood." Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act, 1920, Ch. 42 Stat. 108, reprinted in 1 HAW. REv. STAT. 167-205 (Supp. 
1989). This definition of Native Hawaiian designated two classes of people of Hawaiian 
ancestry by distinguishing between people of Hawaiian ancestry who have less than 50 percent 
native blood and those who have more. Those who have less than 50 percent native blood are 
"Hawaiian" and are defined as "any descendent of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the 
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As the formation of "Asian American" illustrates, race is socially 
constructed. l84 According to Omi and Winant, race as a social construction 
has two components: cultural representation and social structure. 18S "Racial 
projects" are the social mechanisms through which representational and 
structural changes lead to changes in racial identity and meaning. 186 A racial 
project is "simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of 
racial dynamic[s], and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along 
particular racial lines. "187 The political struggles to gain recognition of "Asian 
American" as a racial category are examples of racial projects. Webs of racial 
projects combine to create cultural and racial meaning. 188 
Professor Eric Yamamoto observes that courts are "sites and generators of 
cultural performances."189 From this view, courts transform legal disputes 
Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778." 
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Ch. 42 Stat. 108, reprinted in I HAW. REv. STAT. 
167-205 (Supp. 1989). Another example of racialization involves the definition of Native 
Hawaiian as a "political" rather than "racial" category. While recognizing that in some 
instances, Native Hawaiian is a racial group, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has likened Hawaiians 
to Native Americans and deemed Hawaiians a political group. See Rice v. Cayetano, 941 F. 
Supp. 1529 (1996). See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding that because 
Native Americans have a special relationship to the U.S. government they are a political 
category rather than a racial one). 
184 Another example of the racialization of groups is revealed by the ever-changing U.S. 
Census racial classification system. The 1890 Census included White, Black, Mulatto, 
Quadroon, Octoroon, Chinese, Japanese and Indian. Lopez, supra note 18, at 36. Over time, 
racial categories have been created, eliminated and altered. The 1990 Census included Black, 
White, Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, several choices under "Asian or Pacific Islander," "Hispanic," 
and "Other race." Toro, supra note 176, at 1232. Multiracial groups, in addition, have 
launched a drive for a ''multiracial'' category on the 2000 Census. See Alethea Yip, One or the 
Other, ASIANWEEK, Jan. 3,1997, at 14. 
18S OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 56. 
186 [d. For Orni and Winant, racial projects connect representation and structure, linking 
''what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures 
and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning." [d. 
187 [d. The authors emphasize that racial projects exist in an historical context, "descending 
from previous conflicts." [d. at 58. 
188 [d. at 60. 
189 Eric K. Yamamoto, Moses Haia and Donna Kalama, Courts and the Cultural 
Performance: Native Hawaiians' Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. 
L. REv. 1,6 (1994) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Cultural Performance]. From this view, courts 
serve as forums for processing complex, conflicting social-cultural narratives with historical 
foundations. [d. at 8. Law is "an integral part of political-cultural processes that generate 
'structures of meaning that radiate throughout social life and serve as part of the material people 
use to negotiate their understanding of everyday events and relationships.'" Yamamoto, 
Critical Race PraxiS, supra note 41, at 842 (quoting David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden's 
Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology o/Civil Procedure, 51 LAW AND 
CONTEMP. PROBS. III, 124 (1988». 
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into public messages or socio-Iegal narratives about groups, institutions, and 
relationships.19O Law functions as a "cultural system that structures 
relationships throughout society, not just those that corne before COurts."191 
Cultural representations, or stories about a racialized group's subordinate 
status thus become inscribed in legal textl92 and imprinted into social 
structur~, thereby sanctioning a racial hierarchy.193 In this manner, law and 
cultural representations unite to create and perpetuate racial meaningl94 -law 
becomes a racialization mechanism and functions to perpetuate a racialized 
social structure. 19S 
Arizona's English Only legislation and its exclusion ofracialized groups is 
an example ofracialization. As discussed in Part V, cultural representations 
by proponents of the English Only movement attempt to define who is 
"American" by demarcating who belongs and who does not belong to the U.S. 
polity largely along racial lines. l96 In this fashion, English Only legislation 
creates and shapes racial meaning and functions to perpetuate a racialized 
social structure. 197 
190 A prevailing cultural narrative can be sustained or contested through the sculpting and 
retelling of stories through court process. Yamamoto, Cultural Performance, supra note 189, 
at 21. Courts serve as locations to illuminate institutional power arrangements, tell dominant 
stories and counter-stories to refute dominant narratives. Id. at 27. See also Gerald Torres and 
Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian 
Case, 1990 DUKE LJ. 625 (1990); Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for 
Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Na"ative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1988). 
191 Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41, at 844 (quoting Guyora Binder, Beyond 
Criticism, 55 U. em. L. REv. 888, 889 (1988». 
192 See ARNOLD KRUPAT, ETIIN<H:RmClSM: ETIINOGRAPHY, HISTORY & LITERATURE 133 
(1992). 
193 See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41, at 843-44 (arguing that dominant 
socia-legal narratives legitimize systemic oppression ofracialized minorities); Amicus Curiae 
Brief of Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission, Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Na Loio No 
Na Kanaka and Native Hawaiian Advisory Council in Support of Affirming the Judgment at 
3, Yniguez v Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) 
(asserting that Arizona's English Only amendment "is designed to achieve a false sense of unity 
through an apparently homogenous polity by rendering invisible those who do not look and talk 
like' Americans. "'). See also OMi & WINANT, supra note 18, at 84. 
194 See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41, at 842. 
19S Id. at 844. 
196 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission, et at, in Support of 
Affirming the Judgment at 3, Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) (arguing that 
Article 28 defines along racial lines who can participate in the polity). See infra Part V.B.2. 
197 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission, et aI., in Support of 
Affirming the Judgment at 22, Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) See also OMi 
& WINANT, supra note 18, at 55. While representational and structural factors are intertwined 
and occur simultaneously, this Comment separates the two in order to carefully dissect the 
English Only debates, defended in cultural terms, but racially coded. See infra Part V.B. 
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A. Cultural Representation 
Cultural representations of groups are central to the process of racialization. 
Culture is a "system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic fonns by 
means of which [people] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
knowledge about attitudes toward life."198 These conceptions in turn "serve 
as part of the material people use to negotiate their understanding of everyday 
events and relationships."I99 Cultural representation involves the attachment 
of cultural images to generally recognized racial groups, thereby interpreting 
events and intergroup dynamics and imbuing those events and groups with 
racial meaning.2OO At one level, cultural representations can be blatantly 
racialized. These include representations of the black crack dealer,20I the 
sinister Chinese,202 the lazy Mexican203 or the white man who can'tjump.204 
These widely held racial stereotypes provide people with "common sense" 
explanations of our everyday experiences and perceptions.20S Organizations 
and institutions at the same time draw upon "common" racial meanings to 
support these stereotypes - hiring Asian Americans as midlevel managers, 
for example, because they follow orders and don't make waves.206 
On a deeper level, cultural representations can involve seemingly neutral 
cultural depictions that impart non-neutral racial meanings. In this sense, 
externally neutral debates couched in cultural tenns can be racially coded.207 
Culture-based arguments that avoid race and ethnicity have implications that 
198 CaImore, Multicultural World, supra note 175, at 2182 (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 89 (1973». 
199 Yamainoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41, at 884-85 (quoting David M. Trubek, 
The HandmtJidens Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology o/Civil Procedure, 
51 LAW ANDCoNTEMP. PROBS. III, 124 (1988». Dominant culture, according to Yamamoto, 
"informs how dominant groups think about and act upon race." ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, RACE, 
CULTURE AND REsPONsmILITY: INTERRACIAL JUSTICE IN PosT-CML RIGHTS AMERICA 
[hereinafter YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE] (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with 
author). 
200 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 60. 
201 See PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 85-88 (1991). 
202 WEI, supra note 181, at 48 (exploring evolution of Asian American stereotypes in 
America). 
203 RONALD T AKAKl, A DIFFERENT MIRROR (1993). 
204 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 59. 
20S Id. at 54. See also Calrnore, Racialized Space, supra note 176, at 1242. Linda Krieger 
asserts that racial stereotypes, as unconscious forms of bias, affect intergroup judgment and 
decisionmaking. Krieger, supra note 177, at 1194. 
206 See generally Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41. 
207 See GoLDBERG, supra note 117, at 73; Hing, supra note 40, at 874. 
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are distinctly race-based.208 In the context of the English Only debate, for 
example, racially-coded cultural representations include the notions of 
"linguistic ghettos,"209 "cultural apartheid'llo "ethnic separatism!lll or the 
American "melting pOt."212 As discussed below, these statements, although 
outwardly "cultural" are ideologically racial - they implicitly call for 
allocation of resources along raciallines.213 In this manner, "culture [is] a 
surrogate for race."214 Racial formation theory thus reveals that race and 
culture are dependent and connected. Racial formation also illustrates how 
racialized groups are harmed through negative cultural images, even while 
proponents of those images proclaim, "I'm not racist, I'm talking about 
culture. "21S 
Cultural representation occurs on both levels within the English Only 
debate. At the "cultural" level, supporters of the Arizona English Only statute 
professedly talk about "American" culture, not race. They argue that in order 
to be "American" one must speak only English.216 On another level, blatant, 
disparaging cultural representations of Latinos reveal the ill-will of some 
English Only supporters.217 As Professor Hing observes, both arguments 
share the same philosophical race-based core.218 
208 Hing, supra note 40, at 874. 
209 See Teri Bailey, High Court Begins Debate on 'English Only 'Issue, HOUST. CHRON., 
Dec. 5, 1996, at 1. 
210 Brief of FLA-187 Committee, et aI., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, 
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
211 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Arizona Civil Liberties Union, Los Abogados Hispanic Bar 
Assn., League of United Latin American Citizens, et aI., in Support of Appellants' Appeal at 
30, Ruiz v. Arizonans for Official English, (No. 1 CA-CV 94-235) (Maricopa County Superior 
Court No. CV 92-19603) (quoting Arizona Publicity Pamphlet at 26). 
212 Brief ofFLA-187 Committee, et aI., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, 
Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
213 Yamamoto, Critical Race PraxiS, supra note 41, at 848. 
214 YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 199, at 67. Professor Angela Harris also 
observes that "the exploration of race as culture examines how racial 'others' are created in 
society and how the meanings of 'race' change over time." Harris, Jurisprudence of 
Reconstruction, supra note 144, at 770. 
21S See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41, at 847-88 (asserting that 
antidiscrimination law prohibits discrimination based on skin color, but allows culture 
discrimination). 
216 See Brief of FLA-187 Committee, et aI., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) (calling for linguistic unity to counteract 
non-assimilation and balkanization); Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, et aI., Yniguez 
v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) (invoking images 
of traditional America and threats to national unity in order to advocate a common culture and 
language). 
217 See infra Part V.B.I. 
218 Hing, supra note 40, at 875. 
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B. Social Structure 
The racialization process also affects social structure. Social structure 
involves the standardization and routinization of race, and the reorganization 
and redistribution of resources along racial lines.219 In a racial formation 
context, institutional structures of society serve to clarify racial 
representations and create racial hierarchies within an historical context. 220 
Social situations give rise to structures of inequality that sustain certain 
notions of race.221 Outlawing non-English languages from everyday 
governmental and political activities determines along racial lines who is 
allowed or not allowed to participate in the American polity222 - for example, 
excluding many of Yniguez's Latino clientele from challenging medical 
malpractice. As Omi and Winant suggest, "[t]hrough policies which are 
explicitly or implicitly racial, state institutions organize and enforce the racial 
politics of everyday life."m In this sense, "[t]he racial order is equilibrated 
by the state - encoded in law, organized through policy-making, and 
enforced by a repressive apparatus."224 English Only legislation, for example, 
effectively bars racial, ethnic and language minorities from access to 
governmental assistance and political participation.22S Article 28, likewise, 
would prevent many government employees from speaking Spanish to clients, 
thereby denying many Latinos governmental services in a language they could 
understand. 
Social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based 
upon cultural representations. This, in tum, creates racial meaning. Drawing 
upon this notion, the following Section offers a workable legal principle for 
determining whether a classification is racial for strict scrutiny purposes. 
219 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 56. 
220 [d. 
221 Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 176, at 1242. 
222 See Matsuda, supra note 57, at 1367 (observing the existence ofa "status hierarchy of 
accents. ''). 
223 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 83-84. 
224 [d. at 84. 
223 See, e.g., Jeff Shain, With 'Official English' Law, Some May Be Officially Out of Luck, 
S.F. CHRON, Dec. 1996, at Al (reporting that many Latinos in Arizona would be deprived of 
services in Spanish at medical clinics, state-assistance offices and schools). 
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V. SUBSTANTIAL RACIALIZATION: A PRoPOSAL 
A. A Definition 
Based on the foregoing discussion of Yniguez and the social construction 
of race, and in light of the inadequacy of the current biological notion of race 
relied on by courts and lawyers, this Comment proposes an alternative 
principle for detennining whether a particular governmental classification is 
racial for strict scrutiny purposes: A governmental classification is "racial" 
for strict scrutiny purposes if, considering all the circumstances, the 
classification is substantially racialized. This principle entails 
acknowledgment of the social construction of race and racial formation 
analysis.226 It requires focusing not only on legislators' elusive "intent," but 
on all of the circumstances giving rise to the framing, adoption and 
implementation of the classification, including the text of the classification, 
its official history, the surrounding political rhetoric, the tenor of judicial 
pronouncements, and the classification's overall cultural and social structural 
effects.227 In short, this means inquiring into whether the classification is 
imbued with racial meaning and impact.228 The substantial racialization 
226 See OMI & WINANT, supra note 18 (racial formation). 
227 In some ways, the Seattle-Hunter test, recently applied by U.S. District Court Chief Judge 
Thelton Henderson in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Pete Wilson, is similar to the 
"substantial racialization" test. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Pete Wilson, 1996 WL 
734682 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (No. C 96-4024 TEH) (preliminarily enjoining enforcement of 
California's Proposition 209). The Seattle-Hunter doctrine states that "if an initiative removes 
the authority to address a racial problem - and only a racial problem - from the existing 
decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority interests, it must be examined for 
equal protection purposes as if it were a racial classification." Id. at 17. This requires the court 
to apply a two-pronged test: first. whether there is a "racial focus," in that the initiative singles 
out for special treatment issues that are associated with racial minority interests; and second, 
whether that initiative with a ''racial focus" restructures the political process to the detriment 
of minorities. Id. at 17-22. According to the first prong of the test as Henderson applied it, the 
court must find a "racial focus" by examining the characterization of the measure (by analyzing, 
for example, the ballot pamphlets), the election results, the response by government officials 
after passage of the measure, the effect of the measure and its impact on the political process. 
Id. This test is limited to instances in which an initiative restructures the political process. Id. 
Even while the "racial focus" test implicitly draws upon racialization theory, it does not set 
forth a theoretical framework for determining whether a classification is imbued with racial 
meaning. In contrast to the racial focus test, the "substantial racialization" test suggested by this 
Comment is broader and makes explicit that racialization is the underlying theory. It identifies 
the existence of racial meaning in neutral classifications, thereby triggering strict scrutiny. 
228 This proposed principle draws upon Professor Charles Lawrence, Ill's "cultural 
meaning" test which addresses unconscious wrongdoing to "trigger[] judicial recognition of 
race-based behavior." See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 38, at 324. According 
to Lawrence, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by 
1997 / RETHINKING RACE 249 
principle thus requires assessment of explicit racial representations, implicit 
racial representations coded in the ostensibly neutral terms of "culture," and 
social structural effects along racial group lines. 
Central to the principle is the concept of racialization - the "extension of 
racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social 
practice, or groUp."229 As described earlier, the racialization process is 
essential to racial formation theory. According to racial formation theory, 
race is created, shaped and transformed by social and political forces which 
in turn creates racial and cultural meaning.230 As races are continually formed 
and reformed they are imbued with social meaning. The substantial 
racialization framework draws upon this process in its scrutiny of the 
circumstances surrounding a governmental classification. Interrogation of all 
of the circumstances giving rise to the framing, adoption and implementation 
of a classification is thus for the purpose of ascertaining the classification's 
"substantial" racial meaning and effects. 
The substantial racialization principle is a preliminary approach meant to 
provide a starting point rather than conclusive solutions. When applied, it 
illuminates the underlying racialized character of Article 28, Yniguez, and the 
surrounding English Only rhetoric by revealing the ways in which English 
Only laws determine along racial lines which groups can participate in the 
United States polity. 
B. Application 
This Section elaborates on the substantial racialization principle by 
applying it to the Yniguez case and its surrounding English Only rhetoric. 
"unconscious racial motivation." [d. at 322. He posits that 
beliefs [transmitted by the culture] ... are so much a part of the culture that ... they seem 
part of the individual's rational ordering of her perceptions of the world. The individual 
is unaware, for example, that the ubiquitous presence of a cultural stereotype has 
influenced her perception that blacks are lazy or unintelligent. Because racism is so 
deeply ingrained in our culture, it is likely to be transmitted by tacit understandings .... 
[d. at 323. The cultural meaning test requires evaluation of a governmental classification ''to 
determine whether it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial 
significance." [d. at 324. As such, it requires the consideration of the historical and social 
context in which the decision was made and carried out. [d. at 356. A finding that the culture 
thinks of a governmental action in racial terms would be a determination that the governmental 
actors acted because they were influenced by racial considerations, even though they were not 
aware of their racial beliefs. [d. The Court would then apply strict scrutiny. [d. Lawrence 
asserts that the cultural meaning test "focus[es] our attention on the correct question: Have 
societal attitudes about race influenced the governmental actor's decision?" [d. at 328. See also 
Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 176, at 61-64 (differential racialization). 
229 Omi, supra note 20, at 203. 
230 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55-56. 
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This Comment concludes that Article 28 is substantially racialized and should 
therefore be subject to strict scrutiny review. To illustrate the application of 
the framework in determining whether a classification is racial for strict 
scrutiny purposes, three aspects of the Yniguez case and surrounding English 
Only debates will be analyzed. These aspects are: clear instances of racial 
representations, racialized meanings embedded in "cultural" discourse, and 
social structural effects. Analysis of these aspects collectively reveals the 
"substantial racialization" ofthe Article 28 classification. 
1. Clear Cases of Racialized Discourse 
An essential part of determining whether a classification is substantially 
racialized involves an examination of clear instances of racialized discourse. 
This means examining the overtly racial political rhetoric surrounding the 
English Only movement and Article 28. Because of the restrictive 
"discriminatory intent" test2l1 and increasing sophistication among supporters 
of English Only, supporters refrain from speaking in explicitly racial terms 
even when what they say has racial meaning.232 It is thus difficult to fmd 
explicitly racial statements in support of English Only.233 Nevertheless, some 
presidential hopefuls, anti-immigrant proponents and writers frame the debate 
in blatantly racial terms.234 Some express a fear of a nation ovemm by brown-
skinned non-English speaking Asian and Latino immigrants.23s Others link 
non-English languages to unwanted immigrant groups and argue for 
elimination of those languages.236 Still others assert that Latinos deliberately 
231 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Personal Administrator of Massachusetts 
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
232 See Matsuda, supra note 57, at 1397 (asserting that "[t]he angry insistence the 'they' 
should speak English serves as a proxy for a whole range of fears displaced by the social 
opprobrium directed at explicit racism. "). See also Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 
38, at 324; Krieger, supra note 177. 
233 Authors have identified explicit racial representations of both English Only and anti-
immigrant debates. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 42, 114; Wu, supra note 42, at 38; Hing, 
supra note 40, at 863-64; Calif a, supra note 30, at 326-27. 
234 See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NA nON (1995). 
23S Id. 
236 See Califa, supra note 30, at 328 (arguing that language is a proxy for unwanted racial 
groups). See also Matsuda, supra note 57, at 1354-56. A passage quoted in the Amicus Brief 
of the Arizona Civil Liberties Union also illustrates a similar argument. 
[D]ark skin color and Spanish when spoken by Mexicans went together in the minds of 
Anglos and so the very language itself became a badge of inferiority. Inversely, 
whiteness, English and superior attributes went hand in hand. Thus, when Mexicans were 
rejected on racial grounds, so was the language. 
See Brief Amicus Curiae of Arizona Civil Liberties Union, et al., in Support of Appellants' 
Appeal at 30, Ruiz v. Arizonans for Official English, (No. 1 CA-CV 94-235) (Maricopa County 
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refuse to learn English as part of a political plan of de-assimilation.237 Latinos 
are often represented as "illiterate, impoverished, dirty, backward, criminally 
inclined, ... dark-complexioned, and now pushing cocaine and marijuana 
north for all they are worth."238 These widely held racial stereotypes provide 
"common sense" explanations to explain everyday experiences and 
perceptions.239 And proponents of English Only draw upon these "common" 
racial meanings to support these stereotypes - fashioning English Only laws 
in part to combat the perceived racial threat to the English language and 
"American" culture. 
John Tanton, founder of U.S. English,240 the advocacy group responsible for 
financing the Article 28 campaign, warned in 1986 of a "Latin onslaught. "241 
In a highly controversial memo, he annqunced the white majority's refusal to 
peaceably give up its political power to a brown-skinned group ''that is simply 
more fertile. "242 This rampant fertility of Latinos, he feared, would cause 
"those with their pants up [to] get caught by those with their pants down."243 
Echoing the sentiments of several English Only proponents, Tanton's 
blatantly racist statements revealed both his belief that the only legitimate 
culture is white, and his fear that Latinos pose a threat to white dominance.244 
He connected language to immigrant groups, maintaining that "the question 
of bilingualism grows out of U.S. immigration policy" because the drastically 
increasing Latino population has overwhelmed ''the assimilative capacity of 
the country."24S Tanton drew parallels between South Africa and Southern 
California's increasing minority population, suggesting that powerful, wealthy 
whites and Asians speaking a common language would have to coexist with 
the multitudes of poor, non-English speaking, uneducated Latinos and 
Blacks.246 These images of apartheid suggest a racialized social structure in 
Superior Court No. CV 92-19603) (quoting F. ARTURO ROSALES, "HABLAR EN CRISTIANO": 
THE SPANISH LANGUAGE AND MEXICANS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1848-1950 30 (1990». 
237 See The Balkans, U.S.A., NATIONAL REVIEW, Mar. 5,"1990, at 19. 
238 Califa, supra note 30, at 328 n.227 (quoting McArthur, Wo"ied About Something Else, 
60 INT'L J. Soc. LANG., 87, 91 (1986». McArthur notes that even though these fears are not 
rational, "it can help to make fears tidy and manageable if one talks in an apparently rational 
manner about the Constitution and safeguarding the nation's language-English." [d. (quoting 
McArthur at 91 ). 
239 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 59. See also Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 
176, at 1242. . 
240 Crawford, supra note 61, at 4. 
241 [d. (quoting John Tanton, memo to WITAN IV at 2). 
242 [d. 
243 [d. 
244 Califa, supra note 30, at 326. 
245 Crawford, supra note 61, at 4 (quoting Tanton). 
246 See Calif a, supra note 30, at 27 n.222 (quoting Tanton). 
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which a Latino and African American underclass, while vastly outnumbering 
whites, will remain economically, politically and socially subordinate. 
Finally, he asked, "As Whites see their power and control over their lives 
declining, will they simply go quietly into the night?"247 Easily characterized 
as "racialized," statements such as these place race as the centerpiece ofthe 
English Only discourse. 
Other English Only proponents blatantly frame the debate in racial terms. 
Terry Robbins, head of Dade Americans United to Protect the English 
Language and fonner spokesperson for U.S. English, implied that Latinos 
were encroaching upon America's homogeneous core white culture. 
If Hispanics get their way, perhaps someday Spanish could replace English 
here entirely .... [I]t's precisely because of the large numbers of Hispanics 
who have come here, that we ought to remind them, and better still educate 
them to the fact that the United States is not a mongrel nation. We have a 
common language, it's English and we're damn proud of it.248 
"Mongrel" clearly conjures images of the menacing savage Indian, the sinister 
ponytailed Chinese or the barbarous brown-skinned Hawaiian, and echoes 
early fears of diminishing white racial purity.249 
By reintroducing this vision of American as racially white, anti-
immigranfSO and anti-racial minority, and by demonizing immigrants and 
cultivating perceptions of an American culture overrun by hordes of non-
white immigrants unable or unwilling to learn English, English Only 
proponents use Article 28 as a vehicle to detennine along racial lines who 
belongs in American society and who does not. As these examples suggest, 
blatant racial representations and interpretations of racial dynamics extend 
racial meaning to Article 28. More difficult to detect are those racialized 
agendas cloaked in seemingly benign cultural assertions. In those situations, 
supporters ideologically mean race, but speak in the rhetoric of "culture." 
247 Crawford, supra note 61, at 4 (quoting Tanton). 
248 Califa, supra note 30, at 321 n.183 (quoting presentation by Terry Robbins, Florida Int'l 
Univ. (Oct. 8, 1987». 
249 See RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 16 (1989). [hereinafter 
TAKAKI, STRANGERS]. 
250 Patrick Buchanan, conservative republican candidate in the 1992 presidential election, 
proclaimed 
I think God made all people good, but if we had to take a million immigrants in, say 
Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put them in Virginia, what group would be easier 
to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people of Virginia? 
Hing, supra note 40, at 863-64 (quoting In Buchanan ~ Words, WASH. POST., Feb. 29, 1992, 
at A2). 
1997 / RETHINKING RACE 253 
2. Culture as Su"ogate for RactlSJ 
In contrast to the easily identifiable racialized discourse in the previous 
Section, racialized meanings embedded in "cultural" representations are more 
difficult to detect. This subtle cultural racialization of the English Only 
debate allows moderates to argue in favor of English Only legislation without 
invoking overtly racial images. While explicit racial remarks of the far right 
can simply be dismissed by some as extreme, conservative, and racist,252 
cultural representations with racial undertones are more difficult to unpack 
and therefore more difficult to address. At this deeper level, "mainstream" 
English Only supporters couch the debate about who belongs and who can 
participate in economic and cultural terms, claiming to speak of "American" 
culture, not race. They argue that in order to be "American" one must speak 
English and only English.253 
Warning of "rampant bilingualism," "linguistic ghettos" an~ "language 
rivals," English Only advocates thus argue explicitly for reservation of 
American culture2s4 while racializing the issue by rhetorical sleight of hand: 
"ghetto" refers to inner city African Americans; ''rivals'' implicates Black, 
Latino and Asian gangs; and "rampant" conjures images of hordes of 
Mexicans crossing the Southwest border. In these situations, culture is a 
surrogate for race, and more particularly for racial exclusion.2ss As Professor 
Hing aptly observes, "[g]iven the huge numbers of immigrants who enter this 
country from Asian and Latin American countries whose citizens are not 
white and who in most cases do not speak English, criticism of the inability 
251 YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 199, at 25. 
252 See supra text accompanying notes 233-50. John Crawford observes that the English 
Only campaign is not an extreme fringe movement, but one with a broad following. Crawford, 
supra note 61, at 4. 
2S3 See Brief of FLA-187 Committee, et aI., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974); Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, 
et aI., Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
2S4 According to Professor Juan Perea, the "American" culture they seek to protect is largely 
white, English-speaking and Anglo-Saxon. See Perea, supra note 30, at 276 (arguing that the 
English language is a key component of America's core white culture); TAKAKI, STRANGERS, 
supra note 249, at 7 (noting that "American" is often equated with ·'white."). To many English 
Only supporters, a threat to mainstream American culture by racialized outsiders means, at 
bottom, a threat to the white race. Perea, supra note 30, at 276. 
m See GoLDBERG, supra note 117, at 73 (describing notion of cultural race). Speaking in 
terms of culture legitimates the negation and exclusion of racialized non-English speaking 
groups. For similar arguments see Amicus Curiae Brief of Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission, 
et aI., in Support of Affirming the Judgment at 3, Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
974) (recognizing Article 28's negation of nonwhite racial and cultural groups). 
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to speak English coincides neatly with race."2S6 Interrogation ofthe English 
Only movement's culture-cloaked racialized discourse is thus an essential part 
of substantial racialization analysis. 
The official Arizona Publicity Pamphlet, prepared and distributed by the 
Arizona Secretary of State, urged the Arizona electorate to vote for 
Proposition 106, the proposed English Only amendment.2S7 The pamphlet was 
the only official means to familiarize Arizona voters with the ballot 
proposition.158 The pamphlet's racialized political rhetoric urged voters in 
cultural terms to "stop [the] erosion of our common bond ... threatened by 
language conflicts and ethnic separatism."2S9 "Our common bond" refers to 
a mainstream, homogenous American culture, and "language conflicts" 
implies hostility toward those who do not speak or act like "Americans." 
"Ethnic separatism" suggests that Latinos and other non-English speaking 
groups deliberately choose to "colonize" themselves, demanding "Official 
Spanish" and "official bilingualism" rather than learn English.260 By arguing 
for protection of common "American" customs and values in externally 
neutral language, Proposition 106 supporters implicitly called for allocation 
of resources along racial lines. 
The Arizona Legislative Council's argument in favor of Proposition 106 
likewise pushed for the preservation of a homogenous polity by excluding 
those who do not speak or act like "Americans." 
256 Hing, supra note 40, at 874. Amicus briefs likewise recognized the "thinly disguised" 
racial character of Article 28. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Arizona Civil Liberties Union, 
Los Abogados Hispanic Bar Assn., League of United Latin American Citizens, et al., in Support 
of Appellants' Appeal, Ruiz v. Arizonans for Official English, (No.1 CA-CV 94-235) 
(Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV 92-19603); Brief of Puerto Rican Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, et al., Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(No. 95-974). 
257 See Brief of Amici Curiae Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund; 
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Inc. and Legal Aid Society of San 
Francisco, Employment Law Center, Ruiz v. Arizonans for Official English, (No. 1 CA-CV 94-
235) (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV 92-19603). The pamphlet included the official 
title, text and legislative analysis of Proposition 106 and arguments for and against Proposition 
106 by the Legislative Council and private persons and groups. Id. 
2S8 Id. 
259 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Arizona Civil Liberties Union, et al., in Support of 
Appellants' Appeal at 30, Ruiz v. Arizonans for Official English, (No.1 CA-CV 94-235) 
(Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV 92-19603) (quoting Arizona Publicity Pamphlet at 
26). In Yniguez, similar arguments were advanced by Arizonans for Official English to promote 
Article 28. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 944 (9th Cir. 1995) (en 
banc). 
260 See The Balkans, US.A., NATIONAL REVIEW, Mar. 5,1990 at 19. See also Groups Want 
to Stop Ads in Spanish, SAN JOSE MERe. NEWS, Dec. 23, 1985, at 14D (quoting Terry Robbins, 
spokesperson for U.S. English as saying, "Why does poor Juan and Maria have a problem 
ordering a Whopper? ... It isn't that they aren't able to, they don't want to."). 
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The State of Arizona is at a crossroads. It can move towards the fears and 
tensions of language rivalries and ethnic distrust, or it can reverse this trend 
and strengthen our common bond, the English language.261 
By warning of the "fears and tensions of language rivalries and ethnic 
distrust," the Legislative Council's cultural arguments impart non-neutral 
racial meanings which contribute to the substantial racialization of Article 28. 
"Fears," "tensions," "rivalries" and "ethnic distrust" are in fact value-laden 
words about culture that denigrate racial groups: "rivalries" suggests Latino 
inner city gangs and "ethnic distrust" invokes images of the sinister Asian or 
illegal Latino. The Council's use of "common bond," like the Arizona 
Publicity Pamphlet, implies a homogenous polity that excludes those who do 
not speak or act like "Americans." Linking language and exclusion, 
supporters of Arizona's English Only legislation characterized non-English 
speaking minorities as social threats to the American landscape262 and creators 
of societal conflict. In this fashion, English Only supporters attached cultural 
images to generally recognized racial groups, thereby imbuing Article 28 with 
racial meaning.263 
Ninth (:ircuit Judge Fernandez, in his Yniguez dissent also justified his 
support for English Only in terms of culture. In seemingly neutral terms with 
racialized underpinnings,'Fernandez in effect advocated sustaining a ''unified'' 
white America. To illustrate his view that "diversity limits unity,"264 he 
quoted a passage from Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary 
School District,26S a case in which the Ninth Circuit held that a school district 
had no constitutional duty under the Equal Protection Clause to provide 
bilingual-bicultural education to non-English speaking Mexican-American 
and Yaqui Indian students.266 
Linguistic and cultural diversity within the nation-state, whatever may be its 
advantages from time to time, can restrict the scope of the fundamental 
compact. Diversity limits unity.267 
261 See Brief of Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, et aI., as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 10-11, Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) (quoting 
Arizona Publicity Pamphlet at 26). 
262 See id. at II (exposing racist arguments such as these). 
263 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 60. 
264 Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 959 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
265 587 F.2d 1022 (1978). 
266 [d. at 1027. 
267 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 959 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (quoting Guadalupe Organization, 
Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School District, 587 F.2d at 1027). 
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The passage suggests that in order to create unity, diversity must be 
eliminated. It implies what Tanton and others have explicitly declared: the 
only legitimate culture is white. And in order to preserve a "common 
constellation" of customs and values, we must eliminate the culturally 
different. Judge Fernandez's quoted reference to 18th century America 
supports this conclusion. 
In the language of eighteenth century philosophy, the century in which our 
Constitution was written, the social compact depends on the force of 
benevolence which springs naturally from the hearts of all men but which 
attenuates as it crosses linguistic lines. Multiple linguistic and cultural centers 
impede both the egress of each center's own and the ingress of all others. 
Benevolence, moreover, spends much of its force within each center and, to 
reinforce affection toward insiders, hostility toward outsiders develops.268 
Benevolence, as the passage implies, attenuates as it crosses linguistic lines 
from the core culture to racialized non-English speaking groups, and 
legitimate hostility toward outsider groups increases. The Guadalupe passage 
thus implies that culture is a surrogate for race - American culture is 
"unified" only if it excludes and eliminates culturally different racialized 
minorities.269 Interrogation of Article 28's "cultural" discourse illustrates 
clearly that representations about culture are not neutral; rather they are value-
laden, deeply political, and they extend racial meaning to Article 28.270 
Subtle yet potent racialization of Article 28 is also found in the amicus 
briefs for Arizonans for Official English. Like many other English Only 
proponents, amicus groups cloaked ideologically race-based agendas in 
"neutral" culture-based assertions and argued implicitly for allocation of 
resources along racial lines. 271 The FLA-187 Committee 272 in its brief asserted 
that there is a growing tension between "cultural pluralism" and efforts to 
maintain assimilation.273 The failure of non-English speaking groups to 
assimilate into the "American" cultural mainstream, it argued, foreshadows 
"linguistic and cultural isolation" which in turn causes separatism and 
balkanization, giving non-white groups politicalleverage.274 Warning of the 
268 Id. 
269 See id. 
270 See OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 60. 
271 See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41, at 848 (observing that many in 
power positions use cultural difference to justify exclusion of racialized groups from the polity). 
272 Brief ofFLA-187 Committee, et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Yniguez 
v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-974). The FLA-187 
Committee is a group committed to protecting states' Official English laws. Id. at I. 
273 Id. at 3. 
274 Id. at 14. Immigration restrictionists, Gary Rubin and Frank Sherry in a recent 
memorandum likewise argued that those advocating bilingualism ''want to do away with the 
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dangers of "cultural apartheid" and "cultural and linguistic welfare,"275 the 
Committee implicitly invoked images of race. "Apartheid" implies a 
racialized hierarchical structure, and ''welfare'' conjures images of the urban 
black "welfare queen" whose poverty flows from her own cultural 
deficiencies rather than from structural inequality. 276 The FLA -187 
Committee maintained that the widely varying views of the "traditional 
American melting pot" are causing concern over the United States' ability to 
remain a cohesive political unit. For the Committee, the hallowed place the 
melting pot idea has held has been undermined277 - weakened by increasing 
nonwhite popUlations in seeming conflict with the dominant core culture. 
The conservative Washington Legal Foundation's27s brief also used 
externally neutral cultural representations to impart non-neutral racial 
meanings. The Foundation maintained that the principles upon which this 
country was founded are accessible "to all men in all times," provided 
individuals speak only English.279 It asserted as evidence the cornerstones of 
the "American" experience: the Mayflower Compact, The Declaration of 
Independence, The Federalist Papers, the Constitution, the Gettysburg 
Address and two hundred years of jurisprudence2so - documents that 
historically sanctioned a white "American" culture and mandated exclusion 
of racialized others.2S1 The Foundation in effect argued for exclusion of 
racialized minority groups: "[u]nity comes from a common language and core 
public culture of certain shared values, beliefs and customs which make us 
English language and everything European." Hing, supra note 40, at 875 (quoting 
Memorandum from Gary Rubin and Frank Sherry, National Immigration Refugee and 
Citizenship Forum, Apr. 1,1992). 
America has a language, a history and a culture. It does not want or need to import 
others. For two hundred years immigrants have come to our shores looking for 
something better than what they were leaving behind. . .. They neither expect nor want 
America to tum itself into a banana republic so they can feel more at home. 
Hing, supra note 40, at 875 (quoting Memorandum from Gary Rubin and Frank Sherry, 
National Immigration Refugee and Citizenship forum, Apr. I, 1992). 
275 Brief ofFLA-187 Committee, et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, 
Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
276 See Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 176, at 1247-48. 
m Brief of FLA-187 Committee, et at. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, 
Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). 
278 Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, The Claremont Institute for the Study 
of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy, 34 Members of Congress, and the State of Nebraska 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English 69 F.3d 
920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974). The Washington Legal Foundation is a group committed to 
opposing intrusions by the federal government upon the states. Id. at I. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 24. 
281 See BELL, supra note 137, at 6-44; TAKAKI, STRANGERS, supra note 249, at 14. 
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distinctly' Americans. '''282 It warned of a new "cult of ethnicity ... [that] 
denounce[s] the idea of a melting pot, ... challenge[s] the concept of 'one 
people,' and ... perpetuate[s] separate ethnic and racial communities."283 
This "cult," it claimed, is reversing the "historic idea of a unifying American 
identity."284 The briefs own startling language belies the group's racialized 
understanding of who is "American": concepts embedded in the "American" 
civic mind "make us, the children of immigrants, the 'blood of the blood, and 
flesh of the flesh' of the Founders who came before US."285 
In sum, Article 28 proponents recast unacceptable racial images as 
acceptable harmless cultural images. Even while proponents attempt 
studiously to avoid race using externally neutral arguments, their 
representations are distinctly race-based.286 And their culture-cloaked 
racialization is a way to justify excluding certain undesirable racial groups 
from the polity. 
The substantial racialization principle entails interrogation of cultural 
representations, both blatant and hidden. These representations, along with 
social structural impacts and effects create, shape and perpetuate substantial 
racial meaning. Through the Yniguez legal and political struggle, race is 
formed and reformed. Analysis of English Only cultural rhetoric, along with 
social structural effects, thus points toward the substantial racialization of 
Article 28. 
3. Social Structural Effects 
An examination of social structural effects also plays an essential part in 
ascertaining whether a classification is substantially racialized for strict 
scrutiny purposes. Social structure involves the reorganization and 
redistribution of resources along racial lines based on cultural representations, 
and the creation of racial hierarchies within an historical context.287 Explicitly 
or implicitly racial policies enforce everyday racial politics.288 At the same 
time, "a racialized social structure shapes racial experience and conditions 
282 Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, et ai., as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners at 27-28, Yniguez, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) (citing S. Rep. No. 
132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985». 
283 Id. at 26 (quoting Arthur Schlessinger). 
284 Id. 
285 Id. at 25 (quoting Abraham Lincoln). 
286 See Hing, supra note 40, at 874. 
287 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 56. 
288 Id. at 83-84. 
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meaning. "289 Analysis of social structural effects thus means inquiring into 
whether the classification has racial impact and effects. 
Article 28 has both racial meaning and impact: it determines along racial 
lines who is allowed or not allowed to participate in the American polity by 
excluding those deemed less than "American."290 In effect, English Only laws 
enacted to counteract the perceived threat to mainstream culture operate to 
exclude nonwhites from it.29J 
In Yniguez, Judge Reinhardt recognized Article 28' s disenfranchisement 
and political marginalization of Latinos and other non-English speaking 
minorities in Arizona.292 Writing for the en banc majority, he observed how 
the amendment sanctions a hierarchical organization by viewing particular 
groups' language, and therefore their race, as secondary or subordinate. 
[M]onolingual Spanish-speaking residents of Arizona cannot . . . 
communicate effectively with employees of a state or local housing office 
about a landlord's wrongful retention of a rental deposit, nor can they learn 
from clerks of the state court about how and where to file small claims court 
complaints .... 293 
The passage identifies the racialized social structure created and perpetuated 
by Article 28. Unable to communicate with a housing office, a clerk of a 
small claims court or a state senator, racialized groups would be abruptly 
eliminated from America's social and political activity.294 
The court further recognized that "[t]hose with a limited command of 
English will face commensurate difficulties in obtaining or providing 
289 [d. at 59. 
290 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission, et aI., in Support of 
Affinning the Judgment at 4, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 
1995) (No. 95-974). 
291 See Brief of Human Rights Watch, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondents at 5, 
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-974) (arguing 
that repression of minority languages is usually ''motivated by the desire to repress, marginalize 
or forcibly assimilate the speakers of those languages, who are often perceived as threats to the 
political unity .... "). 
292 Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 952 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
293 [d. at 941. The adverse effects, however, are not limited to Latinos. Indeed, the court 
recognized that Article 28 would adversely affect Native Americans by ''preclud[ing] a 
legislative committee from ... questioning a tribal leader in his native language concerning the 
problems of his community." [d. In addition, a Navajo state senator would be unable to 
"inquir[e] directly of his Navajo-speaking constituents regarding problems they sought to bring 
to his attention." [d. 
294 See id. (stating that non-English speaking minorities would be prevented from receiving 
essential information and ideas). 
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[essential] information."29s If all state and local government officials and 
employees were prohibited from speaking non-English languages, the court 
reasoned, non-English speaking groups could not obtain information 
"concerning their daily needs and lives."296 According to the court, Article 28 
had a virtually limitless reach to include civil servants, teachers, town-hall 
discussions between constituents and representatives and translations of 
judicial proceedings.297 
Judge Reinhardt's special concurrence also identified the racial element in 
Article 28's sweep and revealed most completely its sanction of racialized 
minorities' subordinate position in the social structure. 
[B]ilingual government clerks would not be able to advise persons who can 
speak only Spanish - or Chinese or Navajo - how to apply for food stamps, 
or aid for their children, or unemployment or disability benefits. Public 
employees would be prohIbited from helping non-English speaking residents file 
complaints against those who mistreat them or who violate their rights or even 
from helping them secure driver's licenses or permits to open small businesses. 
Bilingual traffic officers would not be able to give directions to nearby medical 
clinics or schools.298 
Chinese, Navajos and Latinos would be disenfianchised,299 and in effect 
negated,3°O if the amendment were allowed to remain in effect. He also 
295 [d. 
296 [d. at 936. The legislation leaves in place other languages in emergency situations, the 
requirement ofbiIingual schooling for children, and disallows English Only rules that conflict 
with federal laws. ARIZ. CoNST. art. XXVIII § 3(2). 
297 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 932. The federal English Only bill recently passed by the House of 
Representatives also legally sanctions a racialized social order. If implemented, the bill could 
eliminate tax forms, Social Security forms, tourism brochures, and immigration materials in 
languages other than English. See Marc Lacey, Translating the English Only Bill, L.A. TIMEs, 
Aug. 9, 1996, at A3 (reporting on the effects of a federal English Only bill). It could also 
eliminate, for example, Selective Service information in Spanish, and a U.S. postal pamphlet 
showing Spanish-speakers how to buy stamps. [d. English Only laws such as these could also 
omit laws requiring translation of consumer contracts and hinder the development of legislative, 
administrative and judicial reforms to help language minorities. Bender, supra note 54, at 1052 
(arguing that English Only laws adversely affect consumer protection of Latinos). Most 
importantly, the Federal bill would eliminate bilingual ballots, a provision added in 1975 to the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, thereby reducing voter participation among limited-English 
speaking racialized groups and excluding them from full participation in the electoral process. 
See Bert Eljera, Bilingual Voting Under Attack, ASIANWEEK, May 31, 1996, at 8 (reporting on 
effects on over 1 million limited English-proficient voters if bilingual ballots are eliminated). 
298 Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 952-53 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
299 See Statement of Juan Perea before the United States Senate, March 7, 1996, 1996 WL 
7135995 at *14 (arguing against a proposed Senate federal English Only bill). 
300 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission, et al., in Support of 
Affirming the Judgment at 3, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 
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observed that under Article 28, non-English speaking migrant farm workers 
would find themselves deprived of almost all government assistance, and 
"[r]ecent immigrants ... including many who fled persecution, would fmd 
their lives ... unduly harsh .... "301 The impact on racialized groups is clear: 
"migrant farm workers" clearly suggests Latinos, and "recent immigrants who 
fled persecution" implicates Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian immigrants. 
Judge Reinhardt recognized that the sweeping prohibition of non-English 
languages would exclude undesirable immigrant groups from all realms: 
political (communication with representatives, reading and understanding 
ballots), state governmental (applications for benefits, directions for filing 
complaints and obtaining permits) and social (directions to clinics or schools, 
tourism brochures). Article 28 would be a vehicle for excluding groups who 
do not look and sound like "Americans."302 In this manner, Article 28 
reorganizes and redistributes resources along racial lines, preserving control 
over the political and social processes for whites and rendering invisible 
racialized minorities. 
The preceding examples reveal the racialized impacts of Article 28 and the 
English Only movement. They also illustrate how racialization is a product 
of political and social forces. Finally, they show that despite resort to the 
rhetoric of "culture," Article 28 determines whether racial groups will be 
denigrated and "legitimately" cut off from the U.S. polity. Examination of 
social structural effects, along with other circumstances giving rise to the 
framing and adoption of the classification, shows how race is created, shaped 
and transformed by social and political forces and in turn creates racial and 
cultural meaning.303 Analysis of the English Only debates using the 
substantial racialization framework also reveals how law and cultural 
1995) (No. 95-974). 
301 [d. at 952-53 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
302 ACLU attorney Edward Chen similarly argues that "official English" legislation implies 
that "those who do not speak English are somehow less than 'official' and thus relegates them 
to second class status in the eyes of the law." Statement of Edward Chen, Staff Counsel 
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California on Civil Liberties Implications of 
"Official English" Legislation before U.S. Senate, Dec. 6, 1995. Racialization is also identified 
by the political rhetoric opposing other English Only legislation nationally. During debates on 
the House floor about the federal English Only bill, Luis Guiterrez, a Democrat Representative, 
declared that "English Only is the Jim Crow of the 1990s." See Mike Doming, House Clears 
English Only Measure After Emotional Debate, Crne. TRm., Aug. 2, 1996, at 3 (describing 
charged House debates of federal English Only bill). By referring to laws which in the past 
disenfranchised African Americans, he recognized the racialization of the English Only 
discourse - Latinos are similarly disenfranchised through English Only's mandate of a 
racialized social order. 
303 OMI & WINANT, supra note 18, at 55-56. 
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representations unite to create and perpetuate racial meaningl04 and function 
to perpetuate a racialized social structure.30S Applying the substantial 
racialization principle to the Yniguez judicial pronouncements, the 
surrounding political rhetoric and likely social structural effects suggests that 
Article 28 is substantially racialized and should therefore be subject to strict 
scrutiny review. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has shown, through Maria-Kelly Yniguez's story, how the 
law misdefines race for purposes of determining whether strict scrutiny 
review applies. Maria's story helps to illustrate the limitations of the current 
biologically-determined legal paradigm of race. It also helps us to rethink the 
notion of race as socially constructed - changeable, non-neutral, and deeply 
rooted in political struggle. Maria's story also highlights the need for an 
alternative framework with which to view facially neutral racial 
classifications. This Comment has advanced the beginnings of a principle, 
based on theories of racial formation and the social construction of race, to 
determine when facially neutral governmental classifications are 
"substantially racialized" in order to invoke strict scrutiny review. This 
framework suggests going beyond focusing merely on legislators' elusive 
"intent" to interrogate all of the circumstances giving rise to the framing, 
adoption and implementation of the classification. It entails acknowledging 
the social construction of race and inquiring into whether the classification is 
imbued with racial meaning. In doing so, the approach seeks to expose the 
ways in which English Only proponents' racially-coded, culture-based 
arguments demarcate who belongs and who does not belong to the u.s. polity 
largely along racial lines. 
Not all will embrace this proposed principle of substantial racialization. 
Paradigm shifts occur over time. The preceding analysis urges others to 
rethink the concept of racial classifications and work within and beyond 
traditional legal paradigms to acknowledge race's socially contingent and 
value-charged nature. This rethinking, of course, extends beyond English 
Only. It is relevant to other "neutral" racial classifications and to future 
analysis of other contemporary race issues. 
Maria-Kelly Yniguez spoke Spanish on the job. Racially-coded English 
Only laws silenced her voice. By acknowledging that racial classifications 
have tacit racial meanings and effects we can unmask "neutral" classifications 
304 See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 41, at 842. 
30S [d. at 844. 
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and reveal the racialization of governmental actions shaping the content and 
character of American society, 
Susan Kiyomi Serrano306 
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